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THE MISSING VICTIMS OF HEALTH CARE FRAUD
Anthony Kyriakakis*
Abstract
Over the past few decades, combating criminal health care fraud has
become one of the highest priorities of federal law enforcement, which
views and treats it as a financial crime that causes vast economic losses
to the government and private insurers. But the crime also causes, or
threatens, physical harms to individual health care patients, a class of
victims that the criminal justice system often fails to recognize. This Article
is the first to explore how structures and hidden levers of power within the
criminal justice bureaucracy lead agents and prosecutors to select—and
ignore—particular harms and victims and, more importantly, what drives
their selections. The implications extend beyond health care fraud.
Questions about this form of prosecutorial discretion are surprisingly
absent in the scholarly literature. Through the lens of health care fraud, I
show that features of statutory frameworks and sentencing guidelines can
have an outsized influence on the selection of harms and victims in
complex cases, often in unintended ways that merit greater scrutiny.
Internal dynamics within the criminal justice bureaucracy, including those
driven by governmental interests as well as the interests of agents and
prosecutors themselves, also play a significant role. These factors
combine to spur our criminal justice system to treat health care fraud as
just another flavor of fraud, devaluing victims and skewing punishments
of offenders who exploit patients as a means to enrich themselves.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2013, federal agents in Michigan arrested a doctor based on
allegations that he deliberately misdiagnosed patients with cancer so he could profit
from “treating” them, including by causing them to undergo unnecessary
chemotherapy.1 Predictably, patients of the doctor and members of their families
reacted to news of the arrest with outrage and distress.2 From the outset of the case,
law enforcement officials emphasized their own concerns about the welfare of
patients. In a press release announcing the arrest, the United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of Michigan declared, “Our first priority is patient care.”3 Officials
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) issued similar statements concerning the impact of the
doctor’s alleged misconduct on patient health and safety.4
In light of the initial focus on the alleged mistreatment of the doctor’s patients,
members of the public could have reasonably anticipated the indictment, when filed
and made public, would elaborate upon how the doctor had victimized the patients.
Yet, in the nineteen paragraphs that made up the eight-page charging document, just
a single sentence was devoted to describing how the doctor had allegedly caused

1

See Zlati Meyer, Oakland County Cancer Doctor Accused of Unnecessary
Treatments, Defrauding Medicare of Millions, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 7, 2013, 11:34
AM),
http://www.freep.com/article/20130806/NEWS05/308060139/Oakland-Countyoncologist-charged-with-Medicare-fraud, archived at http://perma.cc/FTM8-FZZY. The
criminal complaint against Dr. Farid Fata also claimed, among other things, that he directed
the administration of chemotherapy to end-of-life patients who would not benefit from it and
that he fabricated diagnoses such as anemia and fatigue to justify providing unnecessary
hematology treatments. Complaint at 2, United States v. Fata, No. 2:13-mj-30484 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 6, 2013).
2
See, e.g., Oralander Brand-Williams et al., Doctor’s Arrest Has Patients Worrying—
Prosecutors Urge $9M Bond for Physician in Medicare Fraud Case, DETROIT NEWS, Aug.
13, 2013, at A5; Tony Briscoe, Cancer Patients Meet for Answers—After Doctor’s Arrest,
Gathering 400 Lays Out What Happens Next, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 22, 2013, at A4; Zlati
Meyer, ‘I Trusted This Man Implicitly’—Patients Reel Over Arrest of Cancer Doctor,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 8, 2013, 12:04 AM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130807/
NEWS05/308070173/, archived at http://perma.cc/U662-6H83.
3
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of Mich., Oakland County Doctor and
Owner of Michigan Hematology and Oncology Centers Charged in $35 Million Medicare
Fraud Scheme, (Aug. 6, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/detroit/pressreleases/2013/oakland-county-doctor-and-owner-of-michigan-hematology-and-oncologycenters-charged-in-35-million-medicare-fraud-scheme, archived at http://perma.cc/Z5N5PGSM.
4
An FBI representative stated that “[v]iolating patients’ trust and placing them at risk
through fraudulent abuse of our nation’s health care system is deplorable and a crime which
the FBI takes most seriously,” and an official from HHS affirmed that “[t]he conduct alleged
in this complaint is serious, not only in terms of potential Medicare dollars improperly
obtained, but patient safety as well.” Id.
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patients to receive unnecessary treatments.5 The bulk of the indictment, which
charged one count of health care fraud, instead included an extensive description of
the Medicare program, the intricacies of its reimbursement mechanisms, and the
claims for reimbursement submitted by the doctor.6 The only victim mentioned was
Medicare itself, which was alleged to have been defrauded by the doctor and to have
paid out over $62 million based on his claims for reimbursement.7 Our criminal
justice system transformed a tale of unthinkable betrayal and patient abuse into
something that looked more like an accounting scandal.
What happened? Remarkably, the indictment in the Michigan case is not an
anomaly. This Article will show the Michigan case reflects a widespread
phenomenon in which criminal health care fraud cases are conceptualized,
investigated, and prosecuted as classic fraud cases, not as cases that speak to the
abuses of patients’ health and care. With rare exceptions, the only victims who are
recognized in criminal courtrooms are the ones that pay the bulk of the fraudulent
bills, namely private insurers and the government. To be sure, traditional concepts
of fraud play a central role in many cases of health care fraud. But treating criminal
health care fraud as if it were transsubstantive to other types of fraud discounts a
material difference between health care fraud and crimes like mortgage fraud and
tax fraud: health care fraud can, and often does, threaten physical harm to the health
of individuals—to patients.8
Why should we care about the failure to recognize patients as victims of
criminal health care fraud? For starters, the phenomenon is important because health
care fraud itself has become an important, if not dominant, part of the federal
criminal justice system. Since the enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the number of federal defendants convicted
of crimes related to health care fraud has increased by an astonishing 169%.9 Top
law enforcement officials repeatedly describe health care fraud as one of the nation’s
5

Indictment at 5, United States v. Fata, No. 2:13-cr-20600 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2013).
Id. at 3.
7
Id. at 6.
8
In its financial crime reports, the FBI has repeatedly said “[o]ne of the most significant
trends” in health care fraud cases is medical professionals’ willingness to risk patient harm.
2009 Financial Crimes Report: Fiscal Year 2009, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2009, archived at
http://perma.cc/CWF8-Y85Z (last visited Apr. 6, 2015); see also Reports and Publications,
FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications, archived at
http://perma.cc/6QJG-AK4P (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (cataloguing FBI Crime Reports
between the years 2005 and 2011).
9
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD
AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 1 (2013)
[hereinafter
HCF
ANNUAL
REPORT
FOR
FY
2012],
available
at
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
R4XH-DDBE; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1997, at 1 (1998),
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport1997.PDF, archived at
http://perma.cc/5S6D-GDM4.
6
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highest law enforcement priorities,10 a fact borne out by the most recent FBI
Financial Crimes Report, which revealed the number of pending cases for health
care fraud in fiscal year 2011 outnumbered those for securities and commodities
fraud, financial institution fraud, corporate fraud, money laundering, insurance
fraud, and mass marketing fraud.11 As national health expenditures continue to
swell, the meteoric rise of health care fraud shows no signs of abating, a fact
recognized by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care
Act”), which, among other things, significantly increased criminal penalties for
health care fraud and provided an additional $350 million to support enforcement
efforts.12
For all the rapid growth and prominence of health care fraud, it remains a
surprisingly undertheorized area of the law. This Article charts new ground by
bridging the gap between theory and practice. In the process, it demonstrates that
the criminal justice bureaucracy’s treatment of patient-victims is at odds with
fundamental principles underlying theories of harm, punishment, and the purposes
of criminal law. Moreover, the Article finds the omission of patient harms is
inconsistent with the commonsense notion that we should be using scarce criminal

10
Over the past two decades, top government officials have consistently described
health care fraud as one of federal law enforcement’s highest priorities. See, e.g., FIN. CRIMES
SECTION, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC:
FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 15, available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fcs_
report2006/financial-crimes-report-to-the-public-2006-pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/RQ
M9-TYLG (describing health care fraud investigations as “among the highest priority
investigations within the FBI’s White Collar Crime Program”); Kathleen Sebelius & Eric
Holder, Op-Ed., We’re Finding the Cures for Fraud, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb 11, 2013, at
A11 (stating that President Obama “has made fighting health care fraud a top priority”);
Elizabeth Shogren, Rampant Fraud Complicates Medicare Cures, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1995),
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-08/news/mn-54796_1_medicare-fraud, archived at
http://perma.cc/VN4A-3P4G (reporting that U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno cited health
care fraud as her second-highest priority in 1993); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement
by Attorney General Janet Reno on Health Care Fraud (Mar. 6, 1997), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/1997/March97/095ag.htm, archived at http://perma.
cc/4TB3-BK5Q (“Fighting health care fraud is one of this Administration’s highest
priorities.”).
11
See Financial Crimes Report to the Public: Fiscal Years 2010–2011, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report2010-2011, archived at http://perma.cc/CS4Z-WQEZ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015)
[hereinafter Financial Crimes Report 2010–2011]. The only financial crime listed in the
report that had more pending cases was mortgage fraud, which surpassed health care fraud
by a single case. Id.
12
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 10606, 124 Stat.
119, 1006 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (2012)); Press Release, Dep’t
of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services
Team Up to Crack Down on Health Care Fraud (Nov. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departments-justice-and-health-and-human-services-teamcrack-down-health-care-fraud, archived at http://perma.cc/B4MP-8L5P.

2015]

MISSING VICTIMS OF HEALTH CARE FRAUD

609

enforcement resources to stand up for the people who cannot stand up for
themselves. A primary aim of this Article is to reorient the social meaning of
criminal health care fraud back towards individual patient-victims.13
But to do that, we first must understand why this is happening. We must
determine why the criminal justice system is failing to recognize patients as victims
of health care fraud. This Article posits the answers should trouble us for reasons
that extend well beyond the crime of health care fraud. That is because they apply
more broadly to many other complex crimes involving multiple harms and large
arrays of potential victims—i.e., crimes that I describe as having “malleable harms.”
Such crimes include most “white collar” offenses.
For classic, long-established mala in se crimes like murder, rape, robbery, or
assault, we have well-developed intuitions about harm and punishment tied to the
real, natural persons whom we know to be victims.14 These intuitions are important
13

Criminal prosecutions are just one component of an extensive enforcement
framework that targets health care fraud. It would be difficult to overstate the significant role
played by administrative and civil tools, such as the civil False Claims Act and the so-called
“Stark Law” (a limitation on referrals of Medicare and Medicaid patients to providers who
have a financial relationship with the referring physician), in curbing health care fraud and
in recovering billions of dollars annually for the government. See generally Pamela H. Bucy,
Growing Pains: Using the False Claims Act to Combat Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV.
57, 58 (1999) (discussing the penalties under the False Claims Act) (“The statutorily set
damages and penalties are formidable: treble damages plus a mandatory penalty of $5,000
to $10,000 per false claim. This mounts up. Between 1986 . . . and 1998, total fraud
recoveries as a result of FCA actions filed by private persons have exceeded $2.085 billion.”
(citations omitted)); Pamela H. Bucy, Civil Prosecution of Health Care Fraud, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 693, 694 (1995) (“[C]riminal prosecution may not be the best deterrent. . . .
[P]owerful civil and administrative remedies are needed.”); David A. Hyman, Health Care
Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,”
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 536 (2001) (stating that statutory penalties from causes of action
arising from the False Claims Act “quickly rise to staggering levels,” and that “[i]n one recent
case, a provider accused of receiving an overpayment of $245,392 was sued for statutory
penalties of $81 million”); Joan H. Krause, A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud
Enforcement, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2004) (discussing the False Claims Act and Stark Law’s
effect on health care providers). The scope of this Article, however, is limited to the criminal
side of health care fraud enforcement—to an analysis of how the unique forces and
frameworks within the criminal justice system, as well as the day-to-day practices that are a
part of its bureaucracy, influence the treatment of patient harms in criminal cases and of the
resulting consequences for criminal justice. It bears noting, however, that civil mechanisms
have the potential to play a larger, more significant role in helping to compensate patients
who suffer harm as a result of health care fraud, an idea that has been explored in the writings
of Professor Joan Krause. See Joan H. Krause, Can Health Law Truly Become Patient
Centered?, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1489, 1496, 1498 (2010); Joan H. Krause, A PatientCentered Approach to Health Care Fraud Recovery, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579,
595–608 (2006) [hereinafter Krause, Patient-Centered Approach].
14
See Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571,
576–84 (2011); Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions
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because they help us formulate punishments that are proportional and closer to the
ideal of “just deserts.”15 But for crimes with malleable harms, such as those
involving a fraudulent health care scheme or even a Ponzi scheme, our intuitions
tend to be far less grounded. We may be inclined to punish a Ponzi schemer who
swindles an elderly grandmother out of $200,000 in life savings far more severely
than one who fraudulently obtains double that amount from a large corporation,
barely affecting its bottom line. Punishment intuitions tend to seesaw based on a
variety of factors, including the nature of the harm and whether the victim is a
person, a corporate entity, or the government. These pathologies are worse at the
federal level, where the widespread use of fraud charges often represents more of a
jurisdictional hook than the true gravamen of the wrong.16 The result is that federal
agents and prosecutors wield enormous power to shape our intuitions about such
crimes through their selection of harms and victims.17
The scholarly literature on prosecutorial discretion has focused mostly on the
selection of crimes and on the punishment of criminals. For instance, much has been
written on prosecutors’ control over charging decisions,18 their ability to induce
guilty pleas,19 and the extraordinary influence that prosecutors have over
sentencing.20 But the criminals we choose to prosecute and punish are on just one
of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1891 (2007).
15
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 38–41 (2007).
16
Perhaps the most famous example of a pretextual prosecution is the federal case
against Al Capone, who was ultimately charged with tax evasion, not murder or the illegal
sale of alcohol. For background and analysis of the prosecution against Capone, see Daniel
C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy
of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005) (suggesting that federal courts
could help ameliorate pretextual prosecutions with proper jurisdictional and statutory
interpretation doctrines).
17
See generally Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003) (describing ways in which prosecutors and law
enforcement agents and officers work together on criminal investigations).
18
See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 757–58 (2005); Josh Bowers,
Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1656–63 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean
“Criminal”? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. REV. 193, 201–05 (1991); Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The
Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187,
2188–91 (2010); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 546–72 (2001).
19
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1131 (2011); Alafair S. Burke,
Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 184
(2007).
20
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and
Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1622–25 (2012); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos
Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2–8 (2012); Sonja B. Starr &
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side of the coin. On the other side are the individuals harmed by crime—the victims.
Somewhat surprisingly, questions about how the criminal justice bureaucracy
identifies and selects the victims and harms that populate such cases are absent in
the literature.
This Article is the first to excavate the structures and hidden levers of power
within the machinery of the federal criminal justice system for the purpose of
showing how agents and prosecutors select specific harms and victims in complex
cases and, perhaps more importantly, what drives their decisions. By focusing on
the shaping of health care fraud, I show how largely arbitrary features of statutory
frameworks and sentencing guidelines can influence agents’ and prosecutors’
decisions about which harms to focus upon, often in unintended ways that merit
greater scrutiny. Internal dynamics within the criminal justice bureaucracy,
including those driven by governmental interests as well as the interests of the agents
and prosecutors themselves, also play a role. All of these factors have contributed to
the prevailing tendency to treat health care fraud as just another flavor of fraud
against the government or private insurers. This has caused the harms suffered by
patients to be minimized, overlooked, or ignored.
A final objective of this Article is to show the phenomenon of missing victims
in health care fraud raises deeper questions about the machinery of criminal justice.
Who are the clients and constituencies of prosecutors? Are we misusing scarce
criminal resources to benefit rich and powerful entities that could or should be
availing themselves of civil or other regulatory mechanisms? Do we need a more
fundamental reorientation of criminal law that centers upon the harms suffered by
individual victims, real people who cannot stand up for themselves? At a
fundamental level, there is reason to question whether our system of criminal justice
should be recalibrated to achieve what may be its most basic and legitimate
purpose—preventing people from causing harm to other people.21
Part II places the discussion in context by endeavoring to describe criminal
health care fraud and the various kinds of harm that flow from it. Part III explores
how and why patient harms get relegated to the periphery. It anchors the discussion
first by describing the extraordinary discretion and power of criminal justice insiders
to shape the malleable harms of complex criminal cases.22 It then excavates the
federal criminal justice bureaucracy to identify the external frameworks and internal
forces that influence the day-to-day practices of the agents and prosecutors who
handle cases of health care fraud. Part IV describes previously unexplored
consequences of omitting patient harms from cases of health care fraud, including
M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 13–15 (2013).
21
See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY:
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2009) (explaining that, “[u]ltimately, what underlies the
criminal law is a concern with harms that people suffer and other people cause”).
22
Professor Stephanos Bibas has described those individuals who act within the
criminal justice system as “insiders” who greatly influence its processes and outcomes. See
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 911–18 (2006).
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with respect to the rights of patient-victims, the punishment of offenders, and the
social meaning of the crime itself. It argues that the omission of patient harms causes
health care fraud to be viewed as less morally blameworthy than it would otherwise
be seen, which hampers the overall efficacy of law enforcement efforts to prevent it.
Finally, Part V begins by proposing a set of reforms to relevant statutes, sentencing
guidelines, and bureaucratic structures. Some constitute relatively minor
adjustments to existing frameworks while others call for more systemic changes in
how health care fraud is investigated and prosecuted. It then concludes by addressing
broader normative implications.
II. THE HARMS OF CRIMINAL HEALTH CARE FRAUD
This Article uses the term “criminal health care fraud” to describe a range of
health care crimes that involve knowing misrepresentations or concealments of the
truth that are generally intended to deceive victims into parting with their money or
property—in other words, health care crimes that include traditional elements of
fraud.23 As used here, the term does not apply to those crimes that target abuses
within the health care system but are not rooted in fraud. For example, in 1996,
Congress enacted statutes that punish acts of theft or embezzlement from health care
benefit programs, false statements that relate to health care matters (but that are not
necessarily part of a fraudulent scheme), and the obstruction of criminal health care
investigations.24 While it is true that such crimes are sometimes described as being
part of the broader apparatus that targets health care fraud,25 the conduct that they
proscribe does not normally qualify as “criminal health care fraud” under this
Article’s narrower, more literal interpretation of the term. This is so in part for the
sake of clarity, and in part because, as explained below, the term has already been
stretched to cover an exceedingly large patchwork of crimes.26
23

In criminal health care fraud cases involving kickbacks, however, the theory of fraud,
which was first upheld by courts in 1941, is premised not on an intent to deceive victims into
parting with money or property, but rather to deprive them of “the intangible right of honest
services.” See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–05 (2010) (reviewing the history
of the intangible rights theory of fraud).
24
See 18 U.S.C. § 669 (2012) (theft or embezzlement in connection with health care);
id. § 1035 (false statements relating to health care matters); id. § 1518 (obstruction of
criminal investigations of health care offenses).
25
See, e.g., Tim Drake et al., Health Care Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1131, 1173
(2013) (including theft, embezzlement, false statements, racketeering, and obstruction
offenses in an analysis of statutes that target health care fraud).
26
So-called off-label marketing, in which a drug manufacturer promotes a prescription
drug for a use that has not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), is
another type of misconduct often described as health care fraud. Such cases have resulted in
eye-popping financial recoveries in recent years. See, e.g., David Sell, Glaxo Fined a Record
$3 Billion, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 3, 2012, at A1; Katie Thomas, J.&J. to Pay $2.2 Billion in
Risperdal Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2013, at B1. However, because off-label
marketing is rooted more in the FDA’s marketing and labeling regulations than it is in fraud,
it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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The fact that modern prosecutors use a multitude of statutes to charge health
care fraud is consistent with the history of health care prosecutions during most of
the last century. In a review of all reported prosecutions of health care providers
between 1908 and 1988, one scholar found thirty different statutes were used to
prosecute health care providers in federal courts and twenty statutes were employed
in state courts.27 Even if the number of statutes used today is not quite as large,
prosecutors continue to employ a significant array of criminal laws to charge health
care fraud. They use broad federal laws (health care fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud,
and conspiracy statutes)28 in cases where public and private health care benefit
programs have been victimized. In the subset of cases where only government
programs, such as Medicare, have been targeted, prosecutors can select from a set
of federal statutes with narrower applicability (Medicare and Medicaid fraud, antikickback, and criminal false claims statutes).29 There are also a considerable number
of state laws, largely analogous to the federal statutes, available for prosecutors to
use in state courts. Because health care fraud is prosecuted primarily in federal courts
under federal statutes, this Article focuses on the federal statutes and federal law
enforcement.
It is useful to examine the language and features of these different statutes
because together they set the parameters for what specific conduct will normally fall
within the realm of criminal health care fraud. A good starting point is the federal
health care fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1347, which has emerged as one of the laws
that prosecutors use most frequently.30 Enacted by Congress less than two decades
ago as part of HIPAA, § 1347 criminalizes the knowing and willful execution, or
attempted execution, of any scheme to defraud a health care benefit program, if the
scheme relates to the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or
services.31 “Health care benefit programs” are defined elsewhere to include public
plans, such as Medicare, as well as plans offered by private insurers.32 The decidedly
broad language of § 1347 appears to reflect a congressional intent to cover most, if
not all, of the different kinds of schemes that might be used, now or in the future, to
defraud health care benefit programs.33
27

Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Care Providers,
67 N.C. L. REV. 855, 883 (1989).
28
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud); id. § 1347 (health care
fraud); id. § 1349 (conspiracy).
29
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2012) (Medicare and Medicaid fraud); id. § 1320a-7b(b)
(Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (criminal False Claims Act).
30
Health Care Fraud Prosecutions for 2011, TRAC REPORTS (Aug. 17, 2011),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/258,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/PA6S-EGHK
[hereinafter TRAC REPORTS].
31
18 U.S.C. § 1347(a).
32
Id. § 24(b).
33
See United States v. Lucien, 347 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The broad language of
§ 1347 shows that Congress intended for this statute to include within its scope a wide range
of conduct so that all forms of health care fraud would be proscribed, regardless of the kind
of specific schemes unscrupulous persons may concoct.”).
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Much of the basic structure and language of § 1347 mirrors the federal mail
fraud and wire fraud statutes,34 which are also widely known for the vast breadth of
conduct they can be used to prosecute.35 At a basic level, all three statutes criminalize
the intentional use of fraudulent schemes to deceive others out of money or
property.36 Because nearly all modern health care fraud schemes call for the use of
at least some mailings or interstate wire transfers for the submission of claims or for
the processing of payments, it is rare that a case charged under § 1347 could not
have also been charged under the mail fraud or wire fraud statutes.
It does not come as much of a surprise, then, that for most of the twentieth
century, the mail fraud statute was the most frequently used federal law to prosecute
health care providers.37 The first successful use of the mail fraud statute in a case of
health care fraud appears to have been in 1915, when it was wielded to prosecute a
physician in Philadelphia who defrauded patients by falsely diagnosing them with
“serious ailments” as a means of inducing “them to part with their money.”38 Even
after the enactment of the health care fraud statute in 1996, federal prosecutors
continued to use the mail fraud law, sometimes in lieu of § 1347, as a vehicle to
bring charges in a significant number of cases alleging health care fraud schemes.39
34

See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud).
Chief Justice Burger described the mail fraud statute as a “stopgap device” that can
be used when a new fraud develops until Congress has the opportunity to pass particularized
legislation to deal with the new fraud directly. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405–06
(1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
36
Where the statutes differ from one another is mostly with respect to their distinct
jurisdictional hooks. The wire fraud statute requires that execution of the scheme involve the
use of an interstate wire transmission, the mail fraud statute requires the use of a mailing,
and the health care fraud statute requires the targeted benefit program be one that affects
commerce. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 24(b), 1341, 1343.
37
Bucy, supra note 27, at 882–83 (reporting that 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which regulates
mail fraud, was the statute most commonly used to prosecute health care providers between
1908 and 1988).
38
United States v. Smith, 222 F. 165, 166 (E.D. Pa. 1915). This early health care fraud
case was prosecuted by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. I served in the same office as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for over six years in
a section tasked with prosecuting health care fraud, an experience that provided helpful
insights for this Article.
39
TRAC REPORTS, supra note 30. Data from the Department of Justice shows that over
the past ten years mail fraud has been the lead charge in nearly as many health care fraud
prosecutions as § 1347. Id. Some of these earlier charging decisions may have been
influenced in part by concerns over whether the phrase “knowingly and willfully” in the
health care fraud statute, a term not present in the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes, gave
rise to a “specific intent” requirement. Cf. Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87
IND. L.J. 1033, 1047 (2012) (noting the circuit split over whether Congress’s use of
“knowingly and willfully” in the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b), required “specific intent” to violate the law). The Affordable Care Act put
any such concerns to rest, however, by amending § 1347 to make clear that “a defendant
does not have to have actual knowledge of [§ 1347], or specific intent to commit a violation
of [it].” Id. (citations omitted).
35
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Among the narrower statutes used by prosecutors is the criminal False Claims
Act, which prohibits the knowing presentation of a false claim to any department of
the United States.40 The False Claims Act applies to fraudulent claims for
reimbursement made to government benefit programs, such as Medicare, but not to
those submitted to private benefit plans.41 Fraud against the government can also be
charged under the Medicare and Medicaid fraud statute, which criminalizes, among
other things, the knowing and willful misrepresentation of material facts in any
application for payment under a federal health care program.42 Finally, the Medicare
and Medicaid anti-kickback statute punishes those who offer, solicit, pay, or accept
money or something of value, in exchange for the referral of a patient for services
or items that are paid for by a government health care program.43 Despite the
availability of these narrower government fraud statutes, criminal prosecutors often
select from the broader fraud laws even in cases when the defrauded benefit
programs all qualify as federal,44 perhaps owing in part to the more severe penalties
faced by defendants at sentencing under the health care fraud, mail fraud, and wire
fraud statutes.45
A. Common Behaviors
Beyond their overlapping elements, the above-described laws are also similar
because they say very little about the actual behaviors that might rise to the level of
a material misrepresentation or form the basis of a fraudulent health care scheme.
This is a longstanding problem in defining offenses rooted in fraud.46 As one Civil
40

18 U.S.C. § 287.
Id.
42
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (2012).
43
Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1).
44
Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes by Health Care Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 591–
92. There is a notable exception with respect to cases involving kickbacks: prosecutors favor
the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute over the broader fraud laws. James G.
Sheehan & Jesse A. Goldner, Beyond the Anti-Kickback Statute: New Entities, New Theories
in Healthcare Fraud Prosecutions, 40 J. HEALTH L. 167, 167–68 (2007) (“Kickbacks,
understood as improper payments to obtain referrals of business or favorable treatment, have
been prosecuted as healthcare fraud violations since the early 1970s. Until recently,
prosecutions have been based almost entirely on the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Kickback
Statute . . . .” (citations omitted)). This is so even though Congress made clear, through the
enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, that the reach of the generic fraud laws extends to schemes
depriving others of the intangible right to honest services—understood to mean services free
of kickbacks and bribes. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010).
45
For example, the twenty-year maximum period of imprisonment permitted by the
wire fraud statute is four times as high as the five-year maximum offered by the criminal
False Claims Act and the Medicare and Medicaid fraud statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (criminal
False Claims Act: five-year maximum); id. § 1341 (mail fraud: one-year maximum); id. §
1343 (wire fraud: twenty-year maximum); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (Medicare and Medicaid
fraud: five-year maximum).
46
See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1988–92
41
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War era judge observed, fraud is a term that “admits of no positive definition, and
cannot be controlled in its application by fixed and rigid rules,” but must instead “be
inferred or not, according to the special circumstances of every case.”47 An attempt
to identify and delineate all behaviors that qualify as fraud under the law seems
destined to fail, in part because new behaviors are likely to arise or be conceived
over time.48
As Professor Samuel Buell has explained in his work examining the meaning
of criminal fraud, developing an answer to the question “[w]hat is fraud?” requires
that we study the facts of individual economic encounters in an effort to isolate and
identify what qualifies as an impermissibly deceptive practice.49 Such an approach
seems especially likely to bear fruit in the context of criminal health care fraud,
which normally occurs in an environment with a high volume of economic
encounters between parties who interact with one another regularly and repeatedly
within a highly regulated system. Under such circumstances, one would expect it to
be relatively easy to identify which kinds of economic encounters stand out as
impermissibly deceptive.
Indeed, a review of prosecutions and reports from law enforcement shows a
limited set of behaviors—when coupled with an intent to defraud—have emerged to
form the basis of most of the health care fraud schemes prosecuted today.50 They
can be grouped into seven different categories, described below. The first six all
involve fraudulent billings for health care services or items, and the seventh relates
to the use of kickbacks:
1. No services or items provided: even though a bill claims the provision of
services (e.g., a medical exam) or items (e.g., an oxygen tank) to a patient,
no service or item was actually provided to the patient;
2. Medically unnecessary services or items provided: a bill claims
reimbursement for services or items that were provided to a patient even
though the patient had no medical need for the services or items (e.g., a bill
for unnecessary medicine or tests provided after a doctor purposely renders
a false diagnosis);
3. Excessive services or items provided: a bill claims reimbursement for
services or items that were provided to a patient with some but not
sufficient medical needs to justify provision of the services or items (e.g.,
(2006) (describing a series of historical accounts of fraud’s “chameleon-like quality” that
extend as far back as the Elizabethan era).
47
Fenner v. Dickey, 8 F. Cas. 1138, 1139 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1861) (No. 4729).
48
Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (2011).
Professor Buell observes that “[t]his need for flexibility in the definition of fraud arises
because fraud involves a category of human wrongdoing that is characterized by
inventiveness and that is often situated within realms of economics, technology, and industry
that are sites of rapid social and economic development.” Id. It is difficult to think of a sector
today with more sites of rapid development in those areas than the health care sector.
49
Buell, supra note 46, at 1973.
50
E.g., Financial Crimes Report 2010–2011, supra note 11.
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a bill for daily medical office visits when monthly visits would have been
adequate);
Upcoding: a service or item was provided to a patient, but the bill was
submitted with the wrong procedure or item code, resulting in payment that
is higher than what would have been paid if the correct code had been used;
Duplicate claims: a service or item was provided to a patient, but two
separate bills for the same service/item were submitted, one of which was
altered in some way (e.g., by changing the date of service) to evade
detection of the double payment;
Unbundling: billing rules require that a reimbursement claim for a set of
procedures or tests (e.g., tests performed on a blood sample) be submitted
in a single bill, but multiple bills were submitted to obtain higher payment
(e.g., multiple bills falsely claimed tests were performed separately on
different dates); and
Kickbacks: offender pays or accepts money, or something of value, in
exchange for the referral of a patient for health care services (e.g.,
laboratory owner pays $50 to doctor for each Medicare patient a doctor
sends to laboratory for testing).

Some cases of criminal health care fraud involve just one of the above behaviors,
and others involve multiple groupings of them in different combinations. While
novel schemes will undoubtedly arise and become more prevalent over time,
familiarity with these behaviors provides a rich, if not complete, understanding of
what it generally means to commit criminal health care fraud today.
B. Categories of Harm
The behaviors that form the basis for criminal health care fraud cause a variety
of harms to those who participate in the health care system. Those who make
payments premised upon fraudulent health care billings suffer direct economic
harms. When the schemes behind fraudulent billings have an impact on the medical
services provided to patients, those patients can suffer direct physical harms. And
because of the myriad consequences that flow from decisions about the provision of
health care, criminal health care fraud can also result in an assortment of
miscellaneous harms and consequences to patients. Each of these three categories is
discussed below.
1. Economic Harms
The most readily apparent economic harm from health care fraud occurs when
payments for the reimbursement of health care goods and services are premised upon
claims that are fraudulent. The dollar amounts of those financial losses can be
staggering. If, as some estimates suggest, health care fraud accounts for somewhere
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between 3% and 10% of all national health expenditures,51 then it would be projected
to account for a colossal $93 billion to $309 billion of the nation’s anticipated
spending on health care in 2014.52 Yet, if history is a guide, nowhere close to that
amount will actually be detected and identified as fraudulent, and of the health care
fraud that ultimately is identified, only a subset will be attributed to criminal
behavior. Despite that, the amount of economic harm suffered by victims of criminal
health care fraud that is recognized remains enormous, numbering billions of dollars
annually.53
To ascertain which parties bear the brunt of those losses, we need to look at
who actually pays the nation’s health care bills. However, doing so is more
complicated than one might expect. A defining characteristic of health care
financing in the United States is its complexity, much of which arises from the fact
that payments flow through multiple third-party insurers and payers. Each has its
own rules governing the submission of claims and different policies for determining
what services and items qualify for reimbursement. Further complicating matters,
many bills, including fraudulent ones, are paid in part by patients themselves through
deductible and copayment structures.
Despite the complexities of health care financing, it is not difficult to identify
the parties that pay the greatest amounts for health care and the approximate portions
they pay. For example, spending data shows the federal government pays for the
largest part of the nation’s collective health insurance bill. In 2012 the federal
government, through public programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and smaller
health plans and contracts, made expenditures totaling over 45% of the $2 trillion
spent on health insurance.54 Medicare spending alone accounted for over $572
billion.55 On top of that, state and local governments spent over $187 billion on
health insurance.56

51

Id.
See National Health Expenditure Projections 2012–2022, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVICES 5 tbl.1, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2012.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N55C-HHGM (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (projecting that
national health expenditures will top $3 trillion in 2014).
53
The FBI and HHS reported that federal health care fraud enforcement efforts led to
the collection of approximately $4.2 billion during fiscal year 2012 with a little under $1.4
billion attributable to criminal fines. HCF ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2012, supra note 9, at 1,
5. That amount is a small fraction of the roughly $84 billion to $281 billion estimated to have
been produced by health care fraud in calendar year 2012. Financial Crimes Report 2010–
2011, supra note 11.
54
See Table 19: National Health Expenditures by Type of Expenditure and Program:
Calendar Year 2012, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealth
ExpendData/Downloads/tables.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FUU8-4X4J (last visited
Apr. 6, 2015).
55
See id.
56
See id.
52
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The dozens of insurers that offer private health care coverage to the majority of
U.S. health care consumers and beneficiaries account for the next biggest slice of all
health insurance expenditures. These insurers include commercial insurance
companies, managed care organizations, the nonprofit Blue Cross and Blue Shield
associations, and employers who offer self-insured health plans. In 2012, these
private insurers collectively spent over $916 billion on private health insurance.57
Of course, the economic consequences of criminal health care fraud are felt
well beyond the parties that suffer them directly. To understand the broader impact
of those massive financial losses, it is important to recognize how public and private
benefit programs are funded. Taxpayers finance government programs like
Medicare, and employers and beneficiaries are responsible for paying the premiums
that fund the bulk of private health insurance. As a result, most of the direct
economic harms third-party payers and insurers suffer are eventually passed along
to taxpayers, employers, and beneficiaries in the form of higher tax burdens, more
expensive premiums, and less comprehensive coverage.
Other economic consequences include those associated with the costs of
prevention and enforcement that health care fraud makes necessary. Public and
private insurers spend considerable sums to prevent and detect fraud through audits
and other mechanisms, and the government spends hundreds of millions of dollars
annually to support enforcement efforts. For fiscal year 2012, the appropriation of
funds for the national Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program exceeded $604
million.58
2. Physical Harms
Far less examined than the widely reported economic harms of criminal health
care fraud are the physical harms (and risks of physical harm) that health care fraud
causes patients. The harms can range in seriousness from those resulting in brief
moments of discomfort, such as the pinprick sensation from an unnecessary shot of
medicine, to those causing serious bodily injury or death. At a fundamental level, all
such harms occur when decisions concerning the care and treatment of a patient are
influenced in some way by a fraudulent scheme. However, just as there are specific
kinds of behavior that most commonly form the basis for criminal health care fraud,
there are recurring types of schemes that have a greater tendency to result in physical
harms.
Among the schemes most likely to result in physical harms are those in which
an offender attempts to obtain fraudulent reimbursements by providing patients with
medical services or items that are completely unnecessary. These include the
oncologist in the case described in the Introduction who rendered false cancer
diagnoses so that he could prescribe chemotherapy for patients who did not need it.59
Beyond prescribing unnecessary medicine, offenders sometimes harm patients by
57

See id.
HCF ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2012, supra note 9, at 7.
59
See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
58
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performing unnecessary procedures. For example, a cardiologist performed
unnecessary angioplasty and stenting procedures in a case that resulted in serious
complications for patients, including blood loss, hematomas, jaundice, and arterial
damage.60 In a similar case, a dermatologist performed hundreds of unnecessary
surgeries on elderly Medicare patients, two of whom suffered serious physical
injuries as a result.61
Some fraudulent schemes are premised on the administration of unnecessary
tests, the performance of which can yield significant financial gain for offenders.
While one might think unnecessary medical tests, as opposed to medicine or
procedures, would pose little risk of physical harm, patients can experience serious
side effects even from diagnostic services, as demonstrated in a recent case involving
a family practice physician who administered nuclear cardiac stress tests to her
patients repeatedly, even after the patients’ initial test results came back normal,
exposing them to dangerously high levels of radiation amounting to the equivalent
of at least 80 to 120 chest x-rays per test.62 Unnecessary testing can also be harmful
because test results will in some cases return false positives, which in addition to
producing unnecessary anxiety can cause patients to undergo increasingly invasive
testing and procedures.
When offenders fabricate test results, falsify diagnoses, or alter medical records
to make it falsely appear that treatments or services are medically appropriate,
patients face risks of harm beyond those associated with the unnecessary treatments
or services themselves. A patient’s health may be jeopardized, for example, if a
future medical provider renders a diagnosis or devises a treatment based on false
information previously entered into a patient’s medical chart as part of a fraudulent
scheme.63
Another significant category of cases involves those in which patients have a
legitimate medical need for medicine, but do not receive appropriate amounts of it
as a result of the offender’s scheme. For example, offenders have sought to
personally enrich themselves by giving patients inappropriately low or diluted

60

Brief for the United States at 11, United States v. Patel, 485 F. App’x 702 (5th Cir.
2012) (No. 09-30490), 2011 WL 3287924, at *15.
61
See United States v. Rosin, 263 F. App’x 16, 25 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that the
defendant’s former employees testified that he had falsely diagnosed cancer on biopsy slides
in which skin tissue had been replaced with gum and Styrofoam).
62
See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of Mich., Southfield Family
Practice Doctor, Dr. Gwendolyn Washington, Sentenced to 120 Months for Public
Corruption, Illegal Prescription Drug Trafficking and Health Care Fraud (Nov. 28, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/mie/news/2011/2011_11_28_gwashington.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/DWH2-6UAX.
63
See, e.g., United States v. Sriram, No. 00 CR 0894, 2003 WL 22532800, at *8–9
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2003) (finding that a defendant convicted of health care fraud created a
serious risk of physical injury to his patients by creating false medical records that could
cause patients to be misdiagnosed and given inappropriate medical treatment based on
inaccurate medical history).
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amounts of medicine while billing insurers for the full amounts.64 In other cases,
offenders have given patients toxically high doses of medicine in furtherance of their
schemes.65 Many offenders have sought financial gain by exploiting the addictive
properties of some drugs (especially pain medicines) to exacerbate substance abuse
in their patients, causing them to come in for frequent appointments to refill
prescriptions and receive additional services.66
Sometimes risks of harm come not from the amounts of medicine but from the
quality of the medicine or items provided to a patient as a result of a fraudulent
scheme.67 In other cases, the problem arises less from the quality of the medicine
64
See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that an
oncologist instructed employees to “short” medication to cancer patients); United States v.
Silber, No. 09-20223, 2010 WL 5174588, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2010) (finding that
asthma and arthritis patients were administered diluted doses of medication at clinic); Press
Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Cent. Dist. of Cal., Doctor Who Pleaded Guilty to Health
Care Fraud for Giving AIDS and HIV Patients Diluted Medications Sentenced to 15 Months
in Federal Prison (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/
pr2010/036.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SK98-TTCT (finding that a guilty doctor
subdosed AIDS and HIV patients by sometimes providing the patients with saline, while
submitting bills for full doses of medication).
65
See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 693 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing a presentence investigation report finding that employees of offender’s pain management clinic
told patients that their prescriptions for pain medicine would not be filled unless the patients
agreed to be injected with additional, unnecessary medicine that risked causing pain,
numbness, weakness, and permanent nerve damage); Government’s Motion for an Upward
Departure from Advisory Sentence and Supporting Memorandum of Law at 3–4, United
States v. Achille, No. 06-20496-CR-MOORE (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2007) (citing trial testimony
of a medical expert who stated that high doses of prescribed AIDS medications, which
received high payments from Medicare, were toxic, potentially resulting in hair loss,
neuropathy, paralysis, walking impairments, and death).
66
See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 704 F.3d 1287, 1296–97 (10th Cir. 2013)
(holding that there was sufficient evidence to find that a doctor and nurse executed a
fraudulent scheme to provide patients with pain management treatments that did not
constitute legitimate medical services and resulted in death of three patients); United States
v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that there was “overwhelming
evidence” of a doctor’s fraudulent scheme involving prescribing pain medications for other
than legitimate medical purposes, which caused death of at least one patient); United States
v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 307, 327 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing evidence establishing that an
anesthesiologist who operated a pain-management clinic provided at-risk patients with
treatments that left them dependent on him for pain-suppressant prescriptions and that
resulted in the death of two patients); United States v. Hill, 254 F. App’x 405, 405 (5th Cir.
2007) (citing the sentencing court’s finding of facts, which established that the physician
dispensed addictive painkillers to his patients as part of a health care fraud scheme); United
States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 655 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a psychiatrist specializing in
addiction and pain management “preyed upon vulnerable patients by addicting them to
morphine in order to support his fraudulent billing scheme”).
67
See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1289 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding
that the offender caused physicians to provide recycled blood-derivatives of uncertain quality
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than from the competency of the individuals tasked with providing care to patients.68
Even when the medicines or treatments provided to a patient do not themselves have
harmful side effects, the health of a patient with legitimate medical needs may be
compromised by a scheme that causes the patient to forego legitimate, more
effective, or safer treatments elsewhere.69
Another segment of cases involves schemes that take advantage of the longterm care and nursing needs of the elderly, the disabled, and other vulnerable
victims. Offenders in such cases often profit from benefit programs that cover
disadvantaged groups, such as Medicaid, by operating residential-care and nursinghome facilities that provide substandard levels of care.70
Schemes involving kickbacks can also compromise patient health by causing
medical decisions to hinge on a health care provider’s personal financial interests,
as opposed to the best interests of the patient or sound medical judgment. Patients
can receive inadequate treatment as a result. For example, in a recent case involving
fraudulent claims totaling over $205 million, the defendants paid kickbacks to
managers of an assisted living facility and halfway house, who in turn sent patients
to two healthcare facilities operated by the defendants.71 The scheme caused
to AIDS and hemophilia patients); United States v. Richardson, 117 F. App’x 931, 933 (5th
Cir. 2004), vacated 544 U.S. 970 (2005) (affirming that patients suffered harm or at least
potential harm because they received substandard items, including dirty hospital beds with
worn mattresses); Press Release, U.S. Attorney, N. Dist. of Ill., Ringleader Sentenced to Nine
Years in Federal Prison for Allergy Testing Health Care Fraud Scheme that Bilked Insurance
Companies and Deceived Thousands of Patients (June 29, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2009/pr0629_01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/LM6A-DY7E (finding that allergy shots administered to over 800 patients were prepared in
unsanitary conditions by individuals not licensed or qualified to prepare them).
68
See, e.g., United States v. Bonham, No. 97-10786, 1999 WL 511349, at *2–4 (5th
Cir. June 22, 1999) (holding that a psychiatrist billed for services under his own name when,
in reality, psychiatric services were provided by individuals not licensed in psychiatry).
69
See, e.g., United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F.2d 722, 735 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that patients at weight loss and smoking cessation centers qualified as victims in part because
they may have foregone legitimate treatments while relying on the offender’s ineffective
courses of treatment); Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 2–3, United
States v. Willner, 11-CR-20100-SEITZ (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2012) (arguing that $205 million
Medicare fraud involving a program for patients suffering from dementia, Alzheimer’s
disease, and other conditions was exacerbated by the fact that patients who may have needed
partial hospitalization treatments did not receive them at the illegitimate program prescribed
by the offender).
70
See, e.g., United States v. Fake, 269 F. App’x 208, 210–12 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding
that the operator of residential home for care-dependent and elderly individuals engaged in
a scheme that resulted in bodily harm to as many as ten patients through acts of neglect and
abuse that included failing to provide adequate food to patients, refusing to provide medical
care, and failing to clean patients or provide sanitary living conditions); United States v.
Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 480–83, 500 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that a husband and wife operated
a nursing facility as part of an elaborate Medicaid scheme that caused residents of the facility
to receive inadequate care).
71
United States v. Negron, 517 F. App’x 692, 692–94 (11th Cir. 2013).
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approximately 7,500 patients, most of whom were mentally ill, elderly, or addicted
to drugs, to be “forcibly shuffled” through the facilities where they “rarely met with
doctors” and received either improper treatment or no treatment at all.72
Anecdotal evidence can help illustrate the kinds of physical harms that result
from criminal health care fraud and the different ways in which such harms arise,
but it cannot speak meaningfully about their prevalence. Why does this Article
suggest that incidents of patient harm are “substantial?” How often do fraudulent
schemes actually put patients at risk of harm? These are not questions that lend
themselves to empirical study. No record is created when an investigator decides not
to investigate patient harms or when a prosecutor decides not to reference them in
an indictment or in a sentencing memorandum. However, I use the term
“substantial” for two reasons. First, I draw upon insights from my own experience
working over seven years as a federal prosecutor, six years of which were spent in a
unit tasked with prosecuting health care fraud. It is from that experience that I first
began noticing the not uncommon tendency for potential patient harms to be
minimized, overlooked, or ignored. Second, I rely on the large segment of reported
health care fraud cases from across the country that describe schemes involving
obvious risks to patient health and safety but that seem to give little, if any,
meaningful weight to those risks, such as many of the cases that I cited and described
above. The reasons these kinds of patient harms tend not to be recognized are
explored in Part III of this Article.
3. Miscellaneous Harms and Consequences
In addition to harms that are economic or physical in nature, criminal health
care fraud can give rise to a variety of other, less tangible harms and consequences
to patients. They are diverse in character, but many relate to the tremendous power
that providers of health care can have over the daily lives of their patients. When
providers abuse that power to further a fraudulent scheme, they can disrupt the lives
of patients dramatically.
One kind of disruption relates to the mental distress that fraudulent schemes
can cause patients, some of whom are especially vulnerable at the time of a scheme’s
commission due to their medical conditions. From the fears and anxieties that may
arise from false diagnoses to the feelings of anger and resentment that may stem
from betrayals of trust, victimized patients can experience severe emotional distress
from criminal health care fraud, anguish that can serve to compound the negative
impact of other economic and physical harms. The experience of victimization may
also discourage some patients from seeking necessary medical care in the future.
Fraudulent schemes can also cause distress to patients’ daily lives, impacting
their ability to function and meet obligations at home and work. When a physician
prescribes unnecessary physical therapy in furtherance of a health care scheme, for
72

Brief for the United States at 51–53, 68, Negron, 517 F. App’x 692 (No. 11-16125)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing undisputed facts from the presentence
investigation report).
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example, patients may come to waste substantial amounts of time and effort
participating in unneeded therapy sessions.73 Patients experience even greater
disruptions in their lives from unnecessary hospitalizations, especially when a
physician causes a patient to be hospitalized involuntarily.74
Because the execution of a scheme often involves the creation of false medical
records to further the scheme or conceal its existence, other harms may arise in
connection with the falsified documents themselves. For example, in a case where a
psychiatrist created false records purporting to show that patients had grave mental
and emotional problems, the sentencing judge noted the misinformation would
likely have an impact on patients’ lives in the future, stating “[i]t may determine
whether an individual will be given a health insurance policy; it may decide whether
he or she will receive government clearance; it may affect a whole host of other
situations.”75
When offenders misuse patients’ medical records and personal information in
service of their schemes, they also risk causing violations of their patients’ privacy.76
The submission of a claim for reimbursement can set off a cascade of disclosures
regarding an individual’s personal health information as part of the regular billing
process, and when a claim is submitted without a patient’s knowledge and premised
on services not rendered, such disclosures themselves serve to breach the patient’s
privacy interests. The prospect of subsequent investigation of the fraudulent claim
by the government or private parties has the potential to result in further disclosures
of the patient’s personal health information. Even when safeguards are used to limit
the impact of such additional disclosures, each diminishes the privacy rights of
patients and increases the risk that they will suffer negative consequences as a result.
The potential harms include adverse effects on their prospects for future
employment, damage to their personal relationships, and possible public
embarrassment.
Health care fraud can also harm patients by compromising their ability to get
coverage for future health care needs. In one case, unnecessary hospitalizations had
exhausted patients’ treatment benefits by the time of discharge, including the
lifetime benefits of some patients.77 While the Affordable Care Act now provides

73
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 724 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that a
physician who operated a physical therapy business billed for medically unreasonable and
unnecessary physical therapy sessions and sent employees with little or no medical
background to the homes of elderly Medicare patients to provide “physical therapy”
services).
74
See United States v. Burgos, 137 F.3d 841, 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
psychiatrist furthered a fraudulent scheme by causing unnecessary hospitalization of patients
for periods ranging from ten days to six months); Brief for the United States, supra note 72,
at 52–53 (stating that 7,500 patients were forcibly shuffled through and confined at
healthcare facilities due to fraudulent scheme).
75
United States v. Skodnek, 933 F. Supp. 1108, 1121 (D. Mass. 1996).
76
See Krause, Patient-Centered Approach, supra note 13, at 593.
77
See Burgos, 137 F.3d at 844.
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protection to patients by forbidding lifetime limits on certain essential benefits, some
benefits still remain subject to annual or lifetime per beneficiary caps on coverage.78
Finally, another kind of miscellaneous harm relates to the deprivation of the
intangible right to honest services, which occurs as a result of a kickback scheme.
While it can sometimes be challenging to describe which parties were impacted by
the deprivation of honest services and the ways in which the deprivation impacted
them,79 the use of kickbacks can generally result in overutilization of health services,
increased costs, and, as already described above, inferior quality of treatment for
patients.
III. FAILURES TO RECOGNIZE PATIENT HARMS
Despite the diversity of harms caused by health care fraud, including the
significant physical harms experienced by patients, criminal cases of health care
fraud are widely viewed and treated as white-collar crimes that cause only economic
harms.80 The prevailing enforcement paradigm involves treating health care fraud
like a traditional fraud offense. Federal agents “follow the money.”81 Federal
prosecutors charge offenders with seeking to enrich themselves by deceiving and
defrauding victims—generally, private insurers and government benefit programs,
such as Medicare. And federal judges fashion sentences using sentencing guidelines
driven primarily by the amount of economic loss. Under this model, the government
recovers billions of dollars annually.82
78

See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2012).
See generally David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement
in White Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2008) (discussing the complexities of
describing harms arising from the deprivation of the intangible right to honest services).
80
See, e.g., BENSON WEINTRAUB & ROBERT DAVID MALOVE, WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
HEALTH CARE FRAUD xiv–xv (2013) ( “[A] practice guide for white collar practitioners
. . . . focus[ing] . . . on the salient legal, social, economic, and political issues which are
consequences of health care fraud.”); Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and
the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1327–28 (2001) (describing
health care fraud as a form of “white-collar wrongdoing”); Catharine Goodwin, The Case for
a New Loss Table, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 7, 10 (2000) (citing health care fraud as an example
of an “economic crime”); Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 732 n.20
(1999) (labeling health care fraud as a “white collar offense[]”); Brooke A. Masters,
Investigators Try to Keep Up with Growing Problem of Health Care Fraud, WASH. POST,
Apr. 6, 1997, at B1 (“Health care fraud, once dismissed as part of the cost of medicine, has
become the Justice Department’s top white-collar crime priority . . . .”).
81
Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections on a
Modern-Day Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 343, 344, 353–63 (2010).
82
The federal government recovered approximately $14.9 billion as a result of health
care fraud and prevention efforts in fiscal years 2009 through 2012. See Press Release, Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services
Announce Record-Breaking Recoveries Resulting from Joint Efforts to Combat Health Care
Fraud (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/02/
79
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While the white-collar framework may be adept at returning funds to the public
fisc, we should not lose sight of the fact that it does so at the expense of patients—
the victims who happen to be the least powerful and who suffer harms that are the
most serious.83 How did this come to pass?
This Article posits a two-part answer. The first part starts from the premise that
the harms and victims in many complex federal cases are highly malleable. Health
care fraud, like many white-collar offenses involving multiple harms and victims, is
endogenous to the frameworks we use to prosecute it. Agents and prosecutors acting
under the influence of those frameworks make an assortment of decisions that
ultimately shape the harms and victims that become part of a criminal case. This is
a phenomenon that should trouble us. It occurs in the shadows of the criminal justice
bureaucracy. There are few checks on agents and prosecutors to assure the federal
apparatus of criminal justice is used to address the kinds of harms and victims (real
people) that we, as a society, care about most.
The second part of the answer excavates the frameworks that specifically
pertain to health care fraud to show how and why statutory structures, sentencing
guidelines, internal incentives, and other forces encourage agents and prosecutors to
shape the harms of health care fraud in ways that focus all the attention on the dollars
lost by the government and private insurers while effectively omitting the physical
harms suffered by patients.
A. The Malleability of Harm in Complex Cases
Judges determine the seriousness of offenses based largely on assessments of
the harm done.84 John Stuart Mill famously wrote in his essay On Liberty, “the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized

20130211a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZKL-8T8H.
83
Most of us view the most serious offenses meriting prosecution to be those that
involve actual or threatened physical harm to the body—as opposed to crimes resulting in
pecuniary harm. See, e.g., PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS:
FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED 12 (1997) (noting that a review of
prior studies revealed that a “[f]airly strong consensus exists on the seriousness ordering of
crimes, with those involving actual or threatened physical harm to victims generally
considered to be the most serious”); Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the
Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1,
30–32 (2011) (describing “offenses involving the intentional infliction, or threatened
infliction, of serious physical harm” as a “workable shorthand for the category of ‘grave’
offenses,” consistent with the social-science literature (emphasis omitted)); Ristroph, supra
note 14, at 580 (noting that “crimes against the person reflect societal concerns with physical
injuries”); Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 14, at 1854 (describing “intuitions on the relative
seriousness of wrongdoing”).
84
See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITECOLLAR CRIMINALS 54 (1988) (reporting that the authors’ interviews of judges reflected that
“the key element” in assessing the seriousness of a criminal offense was an assessment of
the harm done).
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community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”85 This harm principle has
been the subject of longstanding debate among legal philosophers and criminal law
scholars.86 More broadly, the concept of harm has received considerable attention
from criminal law theorists.87 Far less studied are the real-world processes that shape
which harms and which victims ultimately are identified, recognized, and made part
of complex federal cases.
The degree to which harm can be shaped and manipulated depends largely on
a case’s complexity. Classic mala in se crimes, such as those involving acts of
violence, typically present harms that are easy to perceive and, as a result, largely
immune to manipulation. If Person A intentionally uses a gun to shoot Person B in
the leg without legal justification, which constitutes the crime of aggravated assault
in some jurisdictions, the immediate harm of the resulting crime (a gunshot wound
in the leg) and the victim of the crime (Person B) would be readily apparent.
Regardless of how the case is investigated or prosecuted, it is unlikely a jury at trial
or a judge at sentencing would be confused about the basic nature of the harm or the
identity of the victim. Those essential facts, which could be conveyed through a
photograph of Person B’s leg, flow naturally from Person A’s violent act. We have
well-established intuitions about the wrongfulness of Person A’s conduct and the
need for punishment.88
As criminal cases increase in complexity, however, their harms and victims
tend to become less self-evident. This is especially true with respect to nonviolent
federal crimes, which do not leave visible injuries that can be examined or bloodied
victims lying in the street. Jurors usually require some context and explanation to
understand the harmful consequences of a bribe. They need background to
apprehend the nature and extent of harms inflicted by insider trading. To identify the
victims of a Ponzi scheme, a judge will often need to see and hear a combination of
evidence, such as testimony from witnesses, cashed checks from victims, or perhaps
emails sent from offenders promising spectacular investment returns. And even after
identifying a victim, a judge may need to examine more evidence to understand the
85

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.,
1978) (1859).
86
See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 120–38 (1999) (describing the general contours of the debate). One
of the most extensive discussions of the harm principle unfolds in Professor Joel Feinberg’s
four-volume series, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS (1984); 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986); 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988).
87
For example, in more recent years, scholars have debated whether the harm of a crime
must be realized in order to justify punishment. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 21,
at 171–96 (arguing that the harm resulting from a crime is “immaterial to what the [criminal]
actor deserves” and that “current law is incorrect to the extent that it provides that resulting
harm makes an actor more blameworthy and deserving of more punishment”).
88
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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full extent of harm—did the victim lose $10,000 or $100,000? In most complex
cases, agents and prosecutors are the ones who need to find and assemble the
evidence and then connect the dots. But when a crime results in multiple harms to
multiple victims, there are no guarantees that all or most of the harms and victims
will become known to a judge or jury, let alone the public.
The criminal justice system cannot identify all the harms and victims of crimes
for the same reason it cannot prosecute all the criminals who commit them—the
finite and scarce nature of criminal justice resources.89 With respect to decisions
about whom to prosecute, Professor William Stuntz explained that budget
constraints tend to focus resources on those criminals who are most cheaply caught
and convicted, a dynamic that he showed results in discriminatory punishment.90 In
this Part, I will show that we cannot neglect the effects of budget constraints on how
federal agents and prosecutors exercise analogous discretion in the selection of
harms and victims in complex federal cases. The discussion is organized into three
key areas—policymaking, investigation, and prosecution. In the face of limited
resources, we need to pay greater attention to how the frameworks established by
policymakers and various other forces within the criminal justice bureaucracy
influence fundamental decisions about which harms and which victims do or do not
get recognized. Failure to do so risks outcomes that do not align with societal values
or the fundamental purposes of our criminal justice system.
1. Policymaking
For classic mala in se crimes, policymakers do little to define relevant harms or
victims. There is not much room to debate who qualifies as a victim of a murder,
and the relevant harm is obvious. But for many of the complex crimes prosecuted
federally, who qualifies as a victim is not always apparent from the elements of the
offense, and what counts as a relevant harm can be subject to debate. Under such
circumstances, the language used by federal policymakers in statutes and sentencing
guidelines can have a tremendous influence on the identification of victims and
harms.
In rare instances, policymakers make explicit value-laden judgments about who
should be counted as a victim for a particular kind of offense. For instance, after
some judges interpreted the sentencing guidelines governing bank fraud to exclude
bank customers whose identities were stolen as a part of a fraudulent scheme from
the tally of total victims, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the guidelines
to make clear that “any individual whose means of identification was used
unlawfully or without authority” should be counted as a victim, even if he suffered
no pecuniary loss.91
89
See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 52 (2011)
(noting “the United States’ justice system lacks the capacity to punish all major crimes—
much less all crimes, period”).
90
See id. at 50–56.
91
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, at 307 (Supp. 2009).
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More commonly, however, federal policymakers shape the identification of
victims and harms by establishing statutory frameworks and sentencing structures
that influence the actions of the agents, prosecutors, and other insiders who operate
within the criminal justice bureaucracy. For some federal crimes, policy decisions
about how to measure and punish harm have an enormous impact on how agents
conduct an investigation. This is especially true for crimes where our notions of
harm and punishment are not grounded in the ways they are for mala in se crimes.
Consider how we gauge punishment for drug trafficking crimes—drug
weights.92 This metric encourages agents and prosecutors to allocate resources
towards developing proof of drug weight, including by focusing on obtaining search
warrants for drug locations, by seeking wiretaps to record traffickers’ conversations
about drug amounts, and by eliciting information about drug quantities from
cooperators and informants. However, as some have argued, drug weight can be an
unreliable proxy for culpability.93 It can also lead to questionable investigative
practices, such as sting operations where undercover agents encourage targets to
participate in large-scale drug deals for purposes of manipulating sentences.94
In the over 500 pages that compose the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Guidelines Manual, scores of sentencing provisions influence how federal agents
and prosecutors carry out investigations and prosecutions, for drug crimes and
hundreds of other federal offenses. With finite resources and limited time, criminal
justice insiders have no choice but to be strategic about how they go about collecting
and presenting evidence. As a result, in complex cases involving multiple harms and
an array of potential victims, the frameworks established within the sentencing
guidelines steer agents and prosecutors to focus on the harms and victims that will
provide the biggest bang for the buck.
Consider the structures in the sentencing guidelines that would govern a basic
case of mail fraud, in which the amount of loss drives punishment more than
anything else. If an investigative team had reason to believe that an offender
defrauded twenty victims of $2 million, but the team’s three-month investigation
yielded evidence sufficient to establish losses of only $1 million to ten victims, the
relevant guidelines would provide them with no incentive to dedicate more time and
investigative resources to uncovering evidence pertaining to the remaining losses
and victims. That is because the guidelines set arbitrary cutoffs that would
recommend increased punishment in such a case only if the government could
establish losses totaling $2.5 million or victims totaling fifty or more.95 Under such
92

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012) (outlining the penalty provisions of the federal drug
trafficking statute).
93
See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Lessons from Two Failures: Sentencing for Cocaine and
Child Pornography Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United States, 76 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 48 (2013) (describing the weight of drugs as a “very weak prox[y]
for the culpability and dangerousness of offenders”).
94
See Eda Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated Culpability, 34 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1401, 1402–04, 1411–12 (2013) (examining the doctrine of sentencing manipulation
and the tactics used by law enforcement).
95
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2013) (loss amount); id.
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circumstances, it would not be surprising for a case agent or prosecutor to decide
that three more months of investigative time would be better spent elsewhere. Of
course, if the Sentencing Commission had set the next punishment cutoffs at $1.5
million or at fifteen total victims, the calculus would have changed.
2. Investigation
An initial question that bears upon the recognition of harms and victims is
whether to investigate a potential crime in the first place. A decision against
investigating particular conduct will foreclose the possibility of a criminal charge,
and no resulting harm will be recognized as part of a criminal case. However, when
agents do decide to initiate an investigation, a similarly pivotal question relates to
when that investigation should end. Finding the stopping point for an investigation
of an offense that has a single victim who suffered a single clearly identifiable harm,
such as in most cases of violent crime, is less challenging than determining when to
conclude a complex investigation involving multiple victims who suffered multiple
harms. The increased complexity of a case can obscure the amount of harm, the
nature of the harm, and the identities of harmed parties. Unearthing that kind of
information often requires a lengthy investigation.
In complex cases, federal investigators exercise tremendous discretion in
deciding which harms and victims to focus on.96 Many factors can influence the
exercise of investigative power. Some of the most important external influences,
already described above, arise from the incentivizing frameworks created by
policymakers. Other incentives exist within the administrative apparatus of the
criminal justice bureaucracy, sometimes described as the “machinery” of criminal
justice.97 As with other kinds of machinery, outside evaluations are based on
assessments of output. Agencies are measured in large part based on arrests.
Prosecuting offices are evaluated based on indictments. Whether quantitative or
qualitative, such measurements give rise to a cascade of incentives that influence
how an investigation addresses potential harms and victims.
Quantitative measurement can create pressures to speed investigations towards
the formal charging of targets so that limited resources can be shifted to other
investigations that in turn lead to more arrests and more indictments. At the level of
the case agent or line prosecutor, supervisors may attempt to boost an office’s arrest
or indictment numbers by instituting formal or unwritten expectations regarding
§ 2B1.1(b)(2) (number of victims).
96
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 927.110(B) (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/
title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.110, archived at http://perma.cc/5GYP-3CMW (“Under the
Federal criminal justice system, the prosecutor has wide latitude in determining when, whom,
how, and even whether to prosecute for apparent violations of Federal criminal law.”).
97
See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15–24 (2012); Erik
Luna, Rage Against the Machine: A Reply to Professors Bierschbach and Bibas, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 2245, 2256–57 (2013) (collecting examples in which courts and scholars have
referred to the administrative apparatus of criminal justice as “machinery”).
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their employees’ “stats”—the total number of each employee’s arrests or
indictments.98 With looming performance reviews in mind, those employees can feel
pressure to expedite investigations toward indictment, garnering an additional stat.
Not surprisingly, the significance of stats in assessing the performance of federal
agents and prosecutors increased markedly after the General Accounting Office
intensified efforts in the late 1990s to pressure the Department of Justice to make
greater use of performance measures with clear targets.99
Yet, pressures to hasten the completion of investigations do not seem to have
led to an epidemic of half-baked criminal charges unsupported by sufficient
evidence.100 Prosecutors generally refrain from commencing a prosecution when
they believe the amount or quality of admissible evidence would not support
conviction.101 Besides ethical concerns, prosecutors have personal incentives to
avoid getting mired in prosecutions with weak evidence because they are more likely
to result in resource-intensive trials or even acquittals.102
Accordingly, the pressures to complete an investigation tend not to jeopardize
efforts to amass the evidence necessary to establish the legal elements of the offenses
to be charged in an indictment—in other words, the evidence needed to prove guilt
at trial. Those parts of an investigation are generally treated as essential and nonnegotiable. Where there is room for flexibility, however, is with respect to the areas
of an investigation pertaining to harms and victims.
Consider a wire fraud charge premised on a scheme that caused each of 100
victims to be defrauded of $10,000. At trial, the government would merely need to
establish that the defendant (1) participated in a scheme to defraud, (2) that he
98

See Todd Lochner, Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence, and a (Half-Hearted) Call for
a Scarlet Letter Approach to Deterring Campaign Finance Violations, 2 ELECTION L.J. 23,
28 n.26 (2003) (observing the author’s interviews with U.S. Attorneys revealed that “a major
criticism of the federal prosecutorial system was that it tended to define ‘excellent’
prosecutors largely by their ability to generate ‘stats’—specifically, number of prosecutions
brought and number won, with oftentimes little regard to the complex[ity] or difficulty of
the cases involved”).
99
See Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise
of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 18–24 (2007).
100
The federal rate of conviction (either through a guilty plea or a trial) was 93% in
fiscal year 2012, and it has been over 90% every year since fiscal year 2001. See U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 8 (2012), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2012/12statrpt.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/C4UD-FC4R.
101
The United States Attorneys’ Manual advises “both as a matter of fundamental
fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be
initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person probably will be
found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 96, § 927.220(B).
102
See generally Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the
Deterrence Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite
Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 885–89 (2013) (discussing how prosecutors evaluate the
sufficiency of evidence in making charging decisions).
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intended to defraud, and that (3) an interstate wire was used in furtherance of the
scheme.103 Because the government would not have to prove the defendant realized
any gain from the scheme or that any victims actually suffered any losses, the
investigative team would have wide latitude to decide how much time and how many
resources to allocate towards the identification of the scheme’s 100 victims and their
respective losses. It could decide the testimony of five victims would be enough to
obtain a conviction and stop the investigation there. Of course, with sufficient time
and resources, the investigative team would likely be able to identify more of the
victims and harms. But in the face of pressure to conclude the investigation, the team
would almost certainly curtail the collection of evidence regarding those
unidentified victims and harms before limiting other, more essential parts of the
investigation.
However, the investigative output of the machinery of criminal justice is not
measured solely by numbers of arrests and indictments. More qualitative
assessments are reflected in press releases that tout the issuance of charges in
especially noteworthy cases, the kinds of “career-making” cases that can be
attractive to ambitious agents. However, rendering qualitative assessments of
complex cases, especially those featuring multiple kinds of harm spread across a
large number of victims, is no easy task. The headlines of agency press releases and
newspaper articles often reflect a propensity to simplify public portrayals of such
cases by reducing them to metrics that are easier to convey and understand—namely,
dollar amounts. Agents in search of “big cases” understand that they tend to be
measured in dollars, at least in the eyes of those who write and read the headlines.
As a result, in complex cases involving both economic and noneconomic harms,
strong incentives exist for agents to build cases by focusing attention on the
economic harms.
Another factor that influences the treatment of harms and victims relates to how
the investigative components of the criminal justice machine are organized. Many
agencies specialize in particular categories of crime, especially at the federal level,
and organize themselves into smaller working groups that are even more specialized.
A large FBI field office, for example, may have a group of agents assigned to
investigate white-collar crime, with smaller groups segmented into clusters that
focus on more specific categories of crime, such as mortgage fraud or bank fraud.
Prosecuting offices can be organized in similar ways, with larger offices tending to
be more specialized.
Such specialization can benefit investigations by harnessing the expertise of
law enforcement agents and prosecutors in ways that increase efficiencies. At the
same time, however, it can have broader, unintended consequences for how agents
and prosecutors approach their jobs.104 When a nascent investigation of a complex
103
See United States v. White, 737 F.3d 1121, 1129 (7th Cir. 2013) (listing the elements
of wire fraud).
104
See generally Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119 (2012) (exploring how the office structures of prosecutors’ offices
affect prosecutors’ professional identities and how they approach their duties).
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case could go in one of several directions, an investigative team with expertise in a
particular area will naturally seek to explore and develop evidence and facts within
that area before venturing into other, less familiar directions. As a result, the harms
and victims that could be discovered in those less familiar places are more likely to
remain unrecognized.
3. Prosecution
Through charging decisions, prosecutors have the power to delineate who is
recognized as a victim in a complex criminal case. In cases where a prosecutor
knows that an offender’s conduct resulted in harm to multiple victims and could
form the basis for dozens of criminal charges, a prosecutor may choose to craft an
indictment that includes only a handful of charges relating to only a subset of
victims. Decisions to limit the scope of the charges could be premised upon a target’s
pre-indictment offer to plead guilty to some but not all of the possible charges, a
prosecutor’s trial strategy (simple is often better at trial), concerns about the
resources needed to prosecute a more complicated case, or a variety of other
considerations.105 Some prosecutors might simply seek to avoid structuring a case in
a way that includes a large number of individual victims, fearing the victims will
cause administrative headaches, complicate plea negotiations, or otherwise slow the
progress of the case.
Even after indictment, crime victims can effectively lose their status as victims
in a criminal case through a prosecutor’s decision to engage in plea bargaining.106 A
prosecutor may offer to drop certain charges relating to a subset of victims as an
inducement to plead guilty, even in cases where there is ample evidence to prove the
charges. Malleable harms can also be manipulated through stipulations in plea
agreements in which the prosecutor and defendant might agree, for example, that
financial losses did not exceed a specific dollar amount or that there were fewer than
ten victims of a crime. A prosecutor may offer such concessions as inducements for
the defendant to plead guilty.107
While the harm suffered by crime victims may or may not be relevant to the
issues that a fact finder must decide at trial, questions pertaining to an offender’s
harms and victims normally are of central importance at sentencing. In preparing for
sentencing, prosecutors make a host of decisions that affect the presentation of harms
and victims. If a prosecutor anticipates that a sentencing guidelines range for an
offender will be too low, the prosecutor will have an incentive to take a more
aggressive tact in seeking sentencing enhancements, some of which will likely turn
105

See Paul G. Cassell et al., Crime Victims’ Rights During Criminal Investigations?
Applying the Crime Victims’ Rights Act Before Criminal Charges Are Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 59, 61, 99 (2014) (discussing state and federal laws giving crime victims
rights to participate in criminal prosecutions).
106
See, e.g., id.
107
While the Department of Justice has had a longstanding policy against “factbargaining” in plea negotiations, several studies have shown that such bargaining continues
to occur. See Starr & Rehavi, supra note 20, at 12.
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on the amount and nature of victim harm. By the same token, if a prosecutor believes
the default guideline range is sufficiently high, he may decide against seeking to
maximize certain harm-based enhancements. Prosecutors also shape victim harms
through their decisions about how to present them. A prosecutor may simply
describe the harms herself, submit written victim statements, or call the victim or
other witnesses to give first-hand accounts of the harms.
It bears noting, however, that a prosecutor’s ability to present victim harms will
be limited by the amount of information the prosecutor has about the victims. If
certain harms were not uncovered during the investigative process prior to
indictment, the prosecutor is unlikely to learn about them prior to sentencing. While
a prosecutor may, in her discretion, seek to restart an investigation after indictment
with an eye towards discovering new information relevant to sentencing, the reality
in most cases is that other ongoing investigations of unindicted targets will take
precedence.108 As a result, most of the victims and harms not revealed during the
initial pre-indictment investigation are likely to remain unidentified.
B. The Shaping of Criminal Health Care Fraud
As shown in Part II, health care fraud can be among the most complex of
crimes, causing multiple kinds of harm to a variety of victims, including government
entities, private insurers, and patients. But by the time the crime passes through the
machinery of criminal justice, it takes the shape of a traditional white-collar fraud
against the powerful entities that pay the bills. The components of the crime that
threaten the health and care of individual patients—real human beings—are
relegated to the periphery, if recognized at all.
When it comes to complex crimes like health care fraud, if we want the output
of the criminal justice machine to correspond to our intuitions about harm,
punishment, and the purposes of the criminal law, it is not enough to sit back and
wait for the machine to do its work. We need to pay attention to the inner workings
of the machine, identify flaws in the system, and be ready to make adjustments.
Below I explore the statutory frameworks, sentencing structures, internal incentives,
and other forces that shape the malleable harms of health care fraud.
1. Statutory Frameworks
The federal laws used to prosecute health care fraud, which account for the
majority of health care fraud prosecutions, can be separated into two groups. The
first includes broad fraud statutes of general applicability, such as the mail fraud and
wire fraud statutes, which were not specifically enacted to address offenses relating
to health care fraud. The second encompasses laws that policymakers crafted with
108

See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261,
292–93 (2011) (discussing how excessive prosecutorial caseloads can negatively impact the
treatment of crime victims).
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the express purpose to combat health care fraud, such as the Medicare and Medicaid
fraud statute and the federal health care fraud statute. The laws in both categories
give rise to frameworks that influence how criminal justice insiders investigate and
prosecute health care fraud.
The framework established in the first category by the generic mail fraud and
wire fraud statutes is among the most well known to prosecutors. Breadth is the
hallmark of these statutes, and beyond their respective jurisdictional requirements,
they essentially require proof that an offender devised a scheme to defraud and acted
with intent to defraud. The statutes authorize maximum penalties of up to twenty
years of imprisonment and fines up to $250,000.109 Increases in the maximum
penalties are triggered when violations affect a financial institution or involve
benefits relating to major disasters or emergency relief, in which case the maximum
penalties increase to thirty years of imprisonment and $1 million in fines.110 The
statutes reference no other kinds of harm.
It is not difficult to see why this framework is so attractive to prosecutors. It
requires proof of relatively simple, straightforward elements that could be applied
to countless fact patterns111 while at the same time offering the possibility of a
significant twenty-year hammer at sentencing. Thus, the fact that this framework is
used extensively in health care fraud prosecutions is not surprising.112 From a policy
perspective, however, one widely overlooked disadvantage of this one-size-fits-all
framework is that it does nothing to steer the attention of agents or prosecutors
towards the unique problems and harms endemic to particular kinds of criminal
schemes (outside of those that affect financial institutions or emergency/disaster
relief). Moreover, as an inchoate offense, its structure does not require proof that an
offender completed her course of conduct or caused a prohibited harm.113 As long
as it can be established that an offender devised a fraudulent scheme with intent to
defraud, it is immaterial whether the fraud succeeded in its goal, and so the
consequences of the fraud are irrelevant to proving its elements.114
As a result, when this framework is applied to health care fraud, it does not
incentivize agents and prosecutors to discover the full range of harmful
consequences caused by an offender. If an investigation reveals that a doctor devised
a fraudulent scheme involving the provision of unnecessary medical services to
patients, the effects of those services on patients are immaterial.
The second category of statutory frameworks comprises those established
through laws that relate specifically to health care fraud, such as § 1347 and the
109

18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 3571(b) (2012).
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See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the
“Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1983) (describing the
utility of the mail fraud statute to lie in “its historic ability to ‘evolve’ over time so as to
cover any new form of misbehavior without need for congressional action”).
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See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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See Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1295, 1322–24 (2008).
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See 18 U.S.C. § 1347.
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Medicare and Medicaid fraud statute. Unlike the structure of the mail fraud and wire
fraud statutes, the structure of the statutes in the second category has an element that
is victim-specific. The reach of § 1347 is explicitly limited to those schemes that
seek to defraud or obtain money from any health care benefit program, such as
Medicare or a private health plan.115 The scope of the Medicare and Medicaid fraud
statute is even narrower because it requires the target of the fraud to have been a
federal health care program.116 In both cases, the statutes focus attention on the
economic aspects of health care fraud.
However, after describing the offense elements, which clearly style health care
benefit programs as victims, § 1347 takes an interesting turn by shifting focus to
physical harms. It provides for increased maximum sentences triggered by bodily
injuries. More specifically, the maximum punishment of ten years’ imprisonment
increases to twenty years if a violation results in “serious bodily injury,” and it
increases to a lifetime sentence if a violation results in death.117
These sentencing enhancements reflect Congress’s recognition that health care
fraud can cause serious physical harms to patients, and that when such harms occur,
they should be factored into criminal prosecutions. At least on the surface, the
penalty structure of § 1347 would seem to encourage agents and prosecutors to
broaden the scope of their investigations to take meaningful account of serious
physical harms suffered by patients. In practice, however, the patient-based
enhancements of § 1347 rarely influence how criminal justice insiders actually
handle health care fraud cases.
First, given that prosecutors almost always have the option to charge health care
fraud as a case of mail or wire fraud, which would allow for a twenty-year maximum
penalty, the enhancement for serious bodily injuries does not afford prosecutors
anything not already available to them. In fact, while the twenty-year maximum
would apply automatically to any mail or wire fraud conviction, prosecutors who
seek the enhancement under § 1347 face the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial that the health care fraud violation resulted in serious bodily injury.118
A second reason why the penalty structure of § 1347 has so little impact is
because only the most egregious kinds of physical harm can trigger the increased
penalties. All physical harms that fall below the level of death or serious bodily
injury are irrelevant under the statute. And the bar is set high for a harm to qualify
as a “serious bodily injury.” It must involve (1) a substantial risk of death, (2)
extreme physical pain, (3) protracted and obvious disfigurement, or (4) protracted
loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.119
Under that high standard, many if not most of the physical harms in the cases
described in Part II would be deemed insufficient. Even the Michigan case in the
115

See id.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2012).
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See 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a).
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See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (holding that, other than a
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Introduction, in which the defendant allegedly caused patients to receive
unnecessary chemotherapy treatment premised upon false cancer diagnoses, might
not present harms that would qualify as serious bodily injuries.120
2. Sentencing Frameworks
On the surface, the sentencing guidelines governing health care fraud seem to
take into account a variety of factors, including whether an offender’s conduct
threatened the health of patients. In practice, however, the guidelines rely almost
exclusively on economic loss as a proxy for measuring harm and culpability and, as
a result, channel investigative resources away from patients and towards dollars.
By far the most consequential decision made by the Sentencing Commission
regarding health care fraud was to associate all the major statutes used to prosecute
it with section 2B1.1, the sentencing guidelines written to govern “Basic Economic
Offenses.”121 Those provisions were written to cover a broad category of offenses
involving “Fraud and Deceit” and a host of other economic crimes.122
In general, the mechanism used by the sentencing guidelines to account for the
aggravating and mitigating facts and circumstances of individual cases is to adjust
an offender’s offense level based on the presence or absence of delineated offense
characteristics. The final offense level, together with an offender’s prior criminal
history, determines the applicable sentencing guidelines range.123 Section 2B1.1 lists
nineteen sets of specific offense characteristics.124 Of those, only five are relevant to
the facts that recur in most cases of health care fraud. They are the provisions relating
to (1) the total loss amount, (2) the loss amount suffered specifically by government
health care programs, (3) the offender’s use of sophisticated means, (4) the total
number of victims, and (5) the conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily
injury.125
While those five sets of specific offense characteristics might appear balanced
between economic and physical harms, in reality they focus nearly all of the
attention of agents and prosecutors on pecuniary losses. The enhancement premised
upon a total loss by itself has the potential to increase an offender’s offense level by

120
Interestingly, without explicitly taking a position on the victim status of patients,
defense counsel in the Michigan case suggested in a court filing that whether the defendant’s
patients could be considered “crime victims” under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act was a
“not inconsiderable question[].” See Answer in Opposition to Motion to Authorize
Procedures Under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2) at 2, United States v. Fata, No. 2:13-cr-20600
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2013).
121
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A (2013).
122
See id. § 2B1.1.
123
See id. § 1B1.1 (outlining sentencing application instructions).
124
See id. § 2B1.1.
125
See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (total loss amount); id. § 2B1.1(b)(2) (number of victims); id.
§ 2B1.1(b)(7) (loss to government health care programs); id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)
(sophisticated means); id. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) (risk of death or serious bodily injury).

638

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

up to thirty levels, depending on the amount of loss.126 No other enhancement comes
close to having that kind of impact. For example, a $400,000 loss by the government
or private insurers would result in a fourteen-level increase in offense levels.127 If
the same offense had resulted in the death or serious bodily injury of a patient (or
even five patients), the offense level would increase by only two levels.128
The disparity of impact between economic and physical harms was made even
starker by the Affordable Care Act, which directed the Sentencing Commission to
strengthen the penalties for health care offenses by adding a separate “government
loss” enhancement to section 2B1.1.129 Now, economic losses suffered specifically
by government health care programs can result in as many as six additional offense
levels under section 2B1.1(b)(7),130 on top of those already calculated from the “total
losses” under section 2B1.1(b)(1).131
Putting aside the two provisions that explicitly relate to financial loss, the
remaining three do little to shift attention to conduct that threatens patients’ health
and safety. The “sophisticated means” enhancement applies only when an offender’s
efforts to execute a scheme or to avoid detection are especially complex or
intricate,132 and proof of such circumstances typically does not call for evidence
relating to patient harm.
Perhaps more surprisingly, the enhancement for the total number of victims
also does not succeed in attracting significant attention to patient harms. It provides
for a two-level increase if an offense involved ten or more victims, a four-level
increase for at least fifty victims, and a six-level increase for 250 or more victims.133
Even though the guidelines define “victims” to include individuals who sustain
“bodily injury” as a result of the offense (as opposed to the higher standard of
“serious bodily injury”),134 the provision fails to induce agents and prosecutors to
shift substantial focus from economic to physical harms for several reasons.
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See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).
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See id. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A). The number of individuals exposed to a risk of death or
serious bodily injury under this subsection has no bearing on how it operates.
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See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 10606(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 119, 1007 (2010).
130
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(7) (2013).
131
The Affordable Care Act also heightened the importance of pecuniary harms by
making it easier for the government to establish higher total loss amounts. It directed the
Sentencing Commission to amend the guidelines “to provide that the aggregate dollar
amount of fraudulent bills submitted to the Government health care program shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the amount of the intended loss by the defendant.” Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act § 10606(a)(2)(B); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1
cmt. n.3(F)(viii) (2013).
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See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B) (2013).
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Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2).
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Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. The sentencing guidelines define “bodily injury” elsewhere as
“any significant injury,” such as “an injury that is painful and obvious, or is of a type for
which medical attention ordinarily would be sought.” Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(B).
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First, as noted previously, the magnitude of the sentencing increases under the
victim enhancement pale in comparison to those available for economic loss.
Moreover, after the first two-level increase for offenses involving ten or more
victims, which in many cases can be satisfied merely by reference to the victimized
public and private insurers, the enhancement requires relatively steep climbs to reach
the 50-victim and 250-victim thresholds. The modest increases gained by reaching
those high thresholds rarely spur prosecutors to allocate the time and resources
necessary to collect sufficient proof of bodily injury for so many victims.135 Lastly,
because the provision does not apply where an offender merely threatened bodily
injury by exposing patients to significant risks of harm (e.g., by administering
unnecessary tests involving high doses of radiation)136 many patient-victims do not
qualify for inclusion.137
Finally, the enhancement that most directly speaks to patient harms, applicable
to offenses involving “the conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily
injury,”138 has minimal impact for several reasons. First, the increase that it
provides—a mere two levels—is too modest to encourage significant investigative
attention. Second, by requiring the risk of harm to have been at the level of death or
serious bodily injury, the provision excludes many of the significant risks to patients
that do not rise to that level. Finally, the provision fails to differentiate between a
case that results in physical injuries to one patient and one that causes injuries to
five, ten, or even a hundred patients. Once a prosecutor establishes that an offender’s
conduct created a conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury, the
actual impact of that conduct on patients, including with respect to the number of
patients harmed, is irrelevant.
135
Part A of Chapter Three of the guidelines provides for various victim-related
enhancements, including a potential increase of up to four offense levels for cases involving
“vulnerable victims,” an enhancement that is sometimes applicable to cases of health care
fraud involving patients deemed vulnerable due to their physical or mental condition. See id.
§ 3A1.1. However, the potential impact of that enhancement is blunted by the fact the full
four-level increase, which is only available for offenses that involved a large number of
vulnerable victims, is not applicable to cases where an enhancement was already applied
under § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) or (C) for an offense involving at least fifty or 250 victims,
respectively. See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(D).
136
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
137
In a recent case in New Jersey, for example, a press release announced that a
cardiologist admitted to participating in a $19 million billing fraud scheme that “subjected
thousands of patients to unnecessary tests and potentially life-threatening, unneeded
treatment, as well as treatment by unlicensed or untrained personnel.” Press Release, U.S.
Attorney’s Office, Dist. of N.J., Prominent Tri-State Cardiologist Admits Record $19
Million Billing Fraud Scheme, Exposing Patients to Unskilled and Unnecessary Medical
Treatment (Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/Katz,%20
Jose%20Sentencing%20News%20Release.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AMX-6TDZ.
Despite the risks of harm to patients from the defendant’s conduct, the government stipulated
to a sentencing guidelines calculation that included no victim enhancement. See Plea
Agreement with Jose Katz, United States v. Katz, No. 2:13-cr-00246 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2013).
138
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) (2013).
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3. Bureaucratic Channeling
Internal organizational structures within the criminal justice bureaucracy also
channel health care fraud cases into investigative avenues that focus on uncovering
pecuniary loss. The primary agency charged with investigating health care fraud, the
FBI, includes its health care fraud investigations within the “FBI White Collar Crime
Program.”139 Prosecutors’ offices often assign health care fraud cases to those units
designated to handle crimes traditionally described as white collar, such as mortgage
fraud and tax fraud.140
What does it mean for a case to be white collar? While the precise definition of
“white-collar crime” has been debated ever since Edwin Sutherland first coined the
term in 1939,141 the definition offered by Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines it
as “[a] nonviolent crime usu[ally] involving cheating or dishonesty in commercial
matters,”142 resonates with how the term is used within the criminal justice
bureaucracy.143
Over time, investigative agents and prosecutors tasked to handle white-collar
cases develop expertise in the techniques and practices that are most effective in
uncovering nonviolent (i.e., financial) harms caused by deceptive conduct.144 They
hone their skills for conducting complex analyses of financial records, improving
their ability to identify and isolate relevant transactions that help them to “follow the
money” to the bad actors that become targets of investigations. They develop an
understanding of what qualifies as an impermissibly deceptive practice by
familiarizing themselves with the common features and qualities of economic
encounters that take place in assorted business environments. In an increasing
number of cases, they become experts at collecting, processing, and organizing
gigantic volumes of electronic records and data obtained from computer hard drives
and other electronic storage media, assembling the evidence necessary to meet their
burdens of proof.
139

HCF ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2012, supra note 9, at 91.
See, e.g., Criminal Division, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. N. DISTRICT OHIO,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ohn/divisions/criminaldivision.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/8JA6-T8NU (last visited Apr. 8, 2015); Criminal Division, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. S. DISTRICT
N.Y., http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/criminal.html, archived at http://perma.cc/A5T6DAY6 (last visited Apr. 8, 2015); Major Frauds Section, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. CENT. DISTRICT
CAL., http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/divisions/mf.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FG8F
-938A (last visited Apr. 8, 2015).
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When agents and prosecutors who operate within these white-collar units are
assigned to handle health care fraud cases, they bring to those cases the practices
and expertise acquired from their general white-collar experience. Not surprisingly,
when a case presents both economic harms to insurers and physical harms to
patients, agents and prosecutors gravitate to what they know best—the investigation
and development of evidence pertaining to pecuniary harms of fraudulent schemes.
For instance, rather than seek to interview a criminal target’s patients or to
analyze their medical records to uncover the physical injuries of a scheme, whitecollar agents typically focus more on collecting claim submission data, studying
voluminous payment records, and interviewing coworkers about a target’s billing
practices. Most efforts to interview patients are geared toward developing proof of
fraud against third-party payers, not of physical harms.
Moreover, white-collar prosecutors inclined to view health care fraud as a
traditional fraud are less likely to designate patients as “crime victims” for purposes
of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).145 As a result, the omitted patients,
including those who suffered bodily harm, are less likely to receive notice of the
rights afforded to crime victims under the CVRA.146
4. Insider Interests
Both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the work done by criminal
justice insiders, and of the collective output of their offices, incentivize the insiders
to steer resources away from developing evidence of patient harms. Pressures felt
by agents and prosecutors to increase their stats create incentives to expedite
investigations towards indictment by focusing on what is needed to establish the raw
statutory elements of health care fraud. Because harms to patients do not
meaningfully factor into the current statutory frameworks, agents and prosecutors
are reluctant to devote time searching for and developing evidence of patient
harms.147
Moreover, investigating patient harms can be far more time-consuming than
other kinds of harm. After gaining access to the names and medical records of
individual patients, an investigative team faces significant challenges in identifying
patients who might have been exposed to risks of physical harm. Interviews of
individual patients, which themselves could take up considerable investigative time,
may need to be supplemented by physical examinations conducted by medical
experts. Medical experts may also be needed to review and interpret patients’
145

See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2012). The CVRA defines a “crime victim” as “a person
directly and proximately harmed” by a charged offense. Id. § 3771(e). Because the statute
designates the government as the party responsible for seeing that crime victims are notified
of their rights, prosecutors exercise discretion in determining which parties fit within the
definition of “crime victim.” See id. § 3771(c).
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Among the rights afforded by the CVRA are the right to receive notice of public
court proceedings; the right to be heard at proceedings involving release, plea, or sentencing;
and the right to confer with the prosecuting attorney in the case. Id. § 3771(a).
147
See supra Part III.A.3.
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medical records. Further complicating matters, it is difficult to predict patients’
reactions to an investigation. While some might be cooperative and knowledgeable
about their medical health, others could be defensive about a trusted doctor’s
behavior or confused about the details of their medical conditions or past treatments.
Far less complicated are the numbers on a spreadsheet listing Medicare
payments or those on a target’s billing records. That kind of evidence is fixed,
secure, and relatively easy to rely upon. Documentary records can be presented to a
grand jury and summarized through a case agent’s testimony within minutes.
Preparing a patient to provide grand jury testimony, however, might require an initial
interview, a medical examination, and a meeting to prepare for the grand jury. And
each additional patient will require the same kind of time and attention. In
environments where insiders feel pressure to conclude an investigation and move on
to others, it is not difficult to see why they opt to focus on developing proof of
economic harms.148
Moreover, as with other complex cases, the dominant measure used to assess
the significance of individual cases of health care fraud is the dollar amount of the
fraud.149 To the extent that a prosecutor views the length of a defendant’s sentence
as correlative to the perceived import of a case, that metric again returns the focus
148

The most recent annual report from the FBI and HHS on the Health Care Fraud and
Abuse Control Program provides a clear example of how pervasively quantitative
measurements can dominate descriptions of the results of agency enforcement efforts. Under
the heading “Enforcement Actions,” the first paragraph of the first page of the report begins
as follows:
In FY 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) opened 1,131 new criminal
health care fraud investigations involving 2,148 potential defendants. Federal
prosecutors had 2,032 health care fraud criminal investigations pending,
involving 3,410 potential defendants, and filed criminal charges in 452 cases
involving 892 defendants. A total of 826 defendants were convicted of health care
fraud-related crimes during the year.
HCF ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2012, supra note 9, at 1.
149
Most press releases issued about health care fraud reflect a clear emphasis on the
dollar amount of the fraud. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of Fla.,
Patient Recruiter and Therapy Staffing Company Owner Sentenced for Roles in $7 Million
Health Care Fraud Scheme (Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/fls/
PressReleases/2013/131220-03.html, archived at http://perma.cc/95SX-JS3C. For instance,
of the twelve press releases concerning health care fraud issued by the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Southern District of Florida during the last two months of 2013, only one does not
reference the dollar amount of the fraud in its headline. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s
Office, S. Dist. of Fla., Two Miami Women Sentenced to Ten Years in Prison for Conspiring
to Pay Healthcare Kickbacks (Dec. 23, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/fls/
PressReleases/2013/131223-01.html, archived at http://perma.cc/K2NB-BRV2; see also
News and Press Releases, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. S. DISTRICT FLA., http://www.justice.gov/usao/
fls/newsArchive/news2013.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D2B3-VHLR (last visited Apr.
8, 2015) (providing links to all 2013 press releases).
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to dollars, given applicable sentencing frameworks.150 Given the infrequency with
which physical harms get recognized as the most significant aspect of a health care
fraud case, it is not surprising when career-minded agents and prosecutors do not
prioritize their identification.
5. Government Interests
Another contributing factor that can turn the focus of investigations away from
patient harms arises from the federal government’s multiple roles when it comes to
the prosecution of health care fraud. In most cases, the government serves as a victim
of the offender’s conduct—often, the victim with the biggest financial losses—and
as the enforcer of the criminal laws that proscribe that conduct.151 More broadly, the
government is the largest beneficiary of the billions of dollars in financial recoveries
that it obtains through criminal cases of health care fraud, including not only with
respect to restitution but also through criminal fines and the forfeiture of assets.152
While the government’s roles as victim and financial beneficiary do not necessarily
conflict with its role as protector of the public interest, there is at least the potential
that the government’s own financial interests in health care fraud recoveries could
influence how it performs its enforcement duties.
As the enforcer of the criminal laws, the government has the burden of
demonstrating the amounts of loss sustained by the victims of an offender’s crime
by a preponderance of the evidence.153 If the government meets its burden, and if the
crime was committed by fraud or deceit, then the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act
of 1996 (MVRA) requires the sentencing judge to issue restitution orders in those
amounts.154 As a victim, the government has a clear interest in maximizing the
amount of criminal restitution that an offender pays. Thus, in cases involving both
economic and physical harms, when there are limited or insufficient resources to
collect and assemble evidence sufficient to establish all the different kinds of harm,
the government’s broad interest as a restitution-maximizing victim naturally
incentivizes it to focus its enforcement resources on developing evidence of the
economic harms.
However, more significant than the government’s interest in collecting
restitution is its broader financial interest in maximizing the overall amount of
monies, including criminal fines, collected through its health care fraud enforcement
efforts. The funds recovered through those efforts do not simply get deposited back
into the general federal Treasury. HIPAA, which controls the disposition of health
care fraud recoveries, provides for a significant part of the recovered monies to be
appropriated back annually to the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account
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See supra Part III.B.2.
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(the HCFAC Account), a special account created to fund law enforcement activities
that specifically target health care fraud.155
Because large sums from the HCFAC Account are distributed back to law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices each year,156 those agencies and
offices (namely, the FBI, HHS, and the United States Attorney’s Offices) have a
significant interest in maximizing the health care fraud recoveries that fund the
HCFAC Account and, indirectly, fund their own future budgets. Some have
described this structure as a sort of “bounty system” that raises potential conflicts of
interest.157
There is a risk, for instance, that government agencies with a financial interest
in monies recovered through criminal fines might tailor investigations and
prosecutions with an eye toward maximizing the amounts of those fines. Given that
judges determine minimum and maximum fine amounts based in part on the offense
levels applicable to an offender under the federal sentencing guidelines,158 and in
light of the fact that the offense levels for health care fraud offenders are determined
largely based on the amount of economic loss,159 the government’s interest in
maximizing those fines constitutes yet another incentive that steers resources toward
developing proof of economic harms.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF OMITTING PATIENT HARMS
Why does it matter if the physical harms suffered by patients as a result of
criminal health care fraud do not get recognized and incorporated into criminal
cases? After all, the law provides other avenues for redress of patient injuries, such
as through civil lawsuits for medical malpractice. Why should prosecutions
premised on deceit and fraud be bogged down with concepts of harm that seem more
befitting a tort action or an assault case?
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See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 201(b), 110 Stat. 1936, 1993. For fiscal years 2010 through 2012, the FBI and HHS
reported that the average return on investment for the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control
Program was “$7.90 returned for every $1.00 expended.” HCF ANNUAL REPORT for FY
2012, supra note 9, at 8.
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In fiscal year 2012, the FBI received $136.2 million in funding, which was used to
support 478 agent positions and 320 support positions, and the HHS Office of Inspector
General received $225.8 million to support law enforcement efforts against health care fraud.
Collectively, the United States Attorney’s Offices received $35.4 million to support civil and
criminal health care fraud enforcement and litigation, and an additional $8.5 million was
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care fraud litigation and interagency coordination. See HCF ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2012,
supra note 9, at 7, 78, 83, 91.
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See Roger Feldman, An Economic Explanation for Fraud and Abuse in Public
Medical Care Programs, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 573–74 (2001); Krause, Patient-Centered
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I offer three sets of reasons. The first relates to punishment. Failing to
meaningfully account for patient harms skews judicial assessments of important
factors relevant to the sentencing of offenders. The second pertains to the social
meaning of criminal health care fraud. The omission of patient harms undermines
the expressive power of punishment and limits the social meaning of health care
fraud in ways that hinder the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts to combat it.
Finally, the third relates to patients. There is reason to doubt whether many of the
patients harmed by offenders can meaningfully seek and obtain redress outside the
scope of a criminal prosecution. Moreover, their recognition as crime victims can be
important for reasons that extend beyond restitution.
A. Skewed Punishments
Failures to account for patient harm at sentencing can undermine the accuracy
with which judges assess the seriousness of offenses. Defects in such assessments
compromise decisions about what constitutes “just deserts” for purposes of
retribution or how much punishment is enough under a deterrence rationale.160 If,
for example, a health care fraud offender defrauds Medicare of $100,000 by
providing patients with unnecessary treatments for diabetes, a judge’s assessment of
the seriousness of the crime will be distorted if she bases it solely on the economic
loss without knowledge that the treatments caused three patients to suffer significant
bodily injury. Punishment premised upon flawed assessments of the seriousness of
an offense will be skewed.
Some criminal law theorists reject the view that the harm from an offender’s
conduct makes the offender any more deserving of punishment.161 Professors Larry
Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan have argued the exclusive focus should be
on an actor’s culpability or, more specifically, the “actor’s choice to release an
unjustifiable risk of harm.”162 Most people agree, at the very least, that an offender’s
mindset should bear upon the issue of punishment.163 However, just as with
160

Retributivists generally believe punishment is justified by an offender’s moral
culpability. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). The theory of deterrence is premised upon the idea that
wrongdoers are deterred when the cost of their conduct, multiplied by the probability of being
punished for it, outweighs the expected benefits of the conduct. See Gary S. Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172–80 (1968); Frank G.
Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A Common Sense Approach, 35
VAND. L. REV. 587, 588–89 (1982).
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See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 21, at 171 (“[C]urrent [criminal] law is
incorrect to the extent that it provides that resulting harm makes an actor more blameworthy
and deserving of more punishment.”).
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See id. at 228.
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See Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1354
(2011) (concluding from an empirical experiment that punishment decisions of study
participants across the purposeful, negligent, and blameless categories adhered to the
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assessments of harm, a judge’s assessments of a health care fraud offender’s
culpability is compromised when she lacks awareness that an offender knowingly or
recklessly exposed patients to harm or risks of harm in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme.
It seems intuitive that, all else being equal, a doctor who defrauds Medicare of
$500,000 by submitting multiple bills for legitimate medical services deserves
markedly less punishment than a doctor who commits the same amount of fraud but
does so by administering unnecessary tests that the doctor knows will expose
patients to unsafe levels of radiation. Yet, at sentencing, without the benefit of
evidence concerning those physical risks of harm, a judge would not be able to
distinguish between the defendants’ dissimilar levels of culpability.164
B. Social Meanings of Criminal Health Care Fraud
When we, as a society, punish, we do so mainly to avert future harm and to
inflict deserved suffering, but under the expressive theory of punishment, the act of
punishment itself has independent meaning. As Professor Joel Feinberg observed,
“punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment
and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either
of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is
inflicted.”165 The expressive power of punishment reflects society’s moral
condemnation of an offender’s behavior. As a result, what conduct a society
punishes reflects whose interests are valued.166
When the criminal justice bureaucracy omits patients and their harms from
cases of health care fraud, the patient-harming aspects of offenders’ behavior
escapes society’s judgment, and sentences are unable to signal the degree to which
such behavior is morally wrongful. We lose the opportunity to show that we, unlike
the offender, value the interests of patients and are committed to protecting them.167
hierarchy assumed by the Model Penal Code).
164
This is not to say that health care fraud defendants should be receiving more time in
prison than they already do, although that may be the case with respect to some offenders
who knowingly or recklessly expose patients to harm. The point is that a system that fails to
recognize victimized patients is one that cannot properly calibrate sentences to advance
traditional purposes of punishment.
165
JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 98 (1970). Punishment expresses society’s judgment in a way that mirrors
the symbolic meaning of an offender’s decision to commit the crime. As Professors
Stephanos Bibas and Richard Bierschbach observed, “[t]he crime . . . carries a symbolic
message from the wrongdoer that the community’s norms do not apply to him and that he is
superior to the victim and others like him.” Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach,
Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 109 (2004).
166
See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 352 (1996).
167
See Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1171, 1200 (2004).
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We, as a society, miss the chance to reinforce social norms that denounce an
offender’s disrespect for an injured patient’s moral worth. When we fail time and
again to express those social norms, there are consequences.
One of the biggest consequences has to do with perceptions of the crime of
health care fraud—perceptions of insiders who investigate and prosecute the crime,
individuals who contemplate committing the crime, and the public. Under current
frameworks, health care fraud is widely perceived as a white-collar crime about
money, not about the abuse of patients. As a result, we regard it to be less morally
blameworthy than crimes known to cause physical injury, such as assault or
robbery.168
Our failure to incorporate patient harms into the social meaning of health care
fraud does more than prevent us from recognizing the moral worth of patients or
from expressing the appropriate moral condemnation due to offenders. It also risks
hindering our success in combating the crime and preventing the enormous financial
drain that it inflicts upon our health care system each year. For example, individuals,
including those contemplating whether to commit health care fraud, take social
meanings into account when making decisions about their actions.169 According to
several empirical studies, people are more willing to obey a law if they believe that
others view the law as worthy of obedience.170 When it comes to health care fraud,
however, some who view enforcement efforts as overly intrusive into the patientphysician relationship or as unfairly targeting well-meaning doctors who are unable
to keep up with arcane billing rules voice considerable ambivalence.171
The popular notion that the only victims of health care fraud are the government
and faceless insurance companies, not the most sympathetic of entities, contributes
to a climate in which some question the wisdom of aggressive enforcement. If
patient harms were more firmly established within the social meaning of health care
fraud, it seems likely that complaints against aggressive enforcement would be
muted and that potential offenders would be less willing to risk incurring the moral
condemnation of others. Because the deterrence effects of punishment would be
significantly amplified, each conviction and sentence could have greater potential to
reduce the number of future acts of health care fraud. Incorporating physical harms
into the social meaning of health care fraud could be a potent means of reducing its
vast economic harms to society, private insurers, and the federal government.
If offenders, criminal justice insiders, and the public all recognized patient
harms as being a part of the social meaning of health care fraud, there likely would
be significant ripple effects across a variety of actors within the criminal justice
bureaucracy, strengthening overall enforcement efforts and promoting greater
recognition of patient harm. Presumably, there would be fewer instances of jury
168
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nullification if jurors were less prone to view an offender at trial as a “well-meaning
doctor” whose conduct merely caused a minor reduction in an insurance company’s
yearly profits. During the course of grand jury investigations, grand jurors would be
more likely to have potential patient harms in mind, causing them to press
prosecutors and witnesses, including testifying investigators, to address the issue.
Similarly, it would be more common for judges at sentencing to probe how an
offender’s scheme could have impacted the health and treatment of patients, and
they would be better prepared to factor such information into their assessments of
harm and culpability. Finally, because qualitative assessments of the work of
investigators and prosecutors tend to be keyed to the social meaning of a crime, the
criteria for those assessments would likely place greater weight on unearthing
evidence of patient harms.
C. Patients
Health care patients in the United States do not have a reputation for being shy
about filing medical malpractice lawsuits. If a patient receives unnecessary medicine
or undergoes medically inappropriate procedures, the criminal justice system does
not provide the only avenue for redress. Why, then, should thin criminal justice
resources be spread more thinly to account for patient harms?
The first part of the answer has to do with the reality faced by patients who seek
redress through civil claims.172 There is reason to believe patients’ access to
remedies through medical malpractice actions is more limited than might be
expected. In a recent national survey of attorneys conducted by Professor Joanna
Shepherd, over 75% of surveyed malpractice attorneys indicated they reject more
172
As the cases described in Part II demonstrate, many patients are exposed to latent
harms and risks of harm they might not discover on their own, such as from unnecessary
exposure to high levels of radiation, unneeded chemotherapy, or diluted medicine. See supra
notes 59–66 and accompanying text. In some instances, harmful consequences might not
manifest until years later. Without receiving notice of a criminal case, patients might never
learn that criminal conduct contributed to their declining health.
This problem is exacerbated by secrecy rules that govern federal grand jury
investigations, which forbid prosecutors and agents from disclosing “matter[s] occurring
before the grand jury.” See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B). The secrecy rules apply even after
the conclusion of an investigation and related criminal proceedings. See Douglas Oil Co. of
Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). As a result, when agents and prosecutors
gain knowledge through a grand jury investigation that a target’s conduct had the potential
to expose patients to harm or risks of harm, that information is likely to stay a secret unless
the prosecutors incorporate it into the prosecution of the criminal case. Outside the context
of a criminal prosecution, they cannot disclose grand jury information directly to hospitals
or to patients that might have been affected by a scheme. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B).
Generally, the parties cannot even disclose the information to the investigators and
prosecutors conducting a parallel civil investigation. See United States v. John Doe, Inc. I,
481 U.S. 102, 114–16 (1987). If they charge and prosecute the criminal case as a traditional
fraud case and focus only on the economic harms suffered by payers, then harms or potential
harms caused to patients might never come to light.
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than 90% of cases they screen.173 Citing high costs of litigation, the majority reported
they would not consider accepting a new case unless it met certain threshold
damages values.174 Even for a case almost certain to be successful on the merits
(such as one involving a civil defendant already convicted of criminal health care
fraud), medical malpractice attorneys reported they would not accept the case unless
expected damages amounted to at least $250,000.175 Without access to legal
representation, patients have miniscule chances of receiving compensation through
medical malpractice claims.176 In contrast, restitution for crime victims’ bodily
injuries are automatic under the MVRA, which requires sentencing judges to issue
restitution orders covering, among other things, the costs of medical treatments
needed to address injuries, the costs of physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation, and income lost by victims as a result of offenses.177
However, being recognized as a victim of a crime is about more than restitution.
Scholars have explored how recognition can be important in other ways. It can
dignify victims’ personal experiences by providing them with opportunities to
address the court.178 It can have healing effects, countering the parts of victimization
that leave some victims feeling powerless and ashamed.179 The presence of victims
in the courtroom also gives criminal defendants important opportunities to express
remorse and apologize to those they have wronged.180
While being victimized can be a traumatic experience for many crime victims,
violations felt by health care patients can be especially destructive. Professors
Stephanos Bibas and Richard Bierschbach describe a relational concept of crime
premised upon the idea that crime “disrupts status relationships among offenders,
victims, and [their] communities.”181 They note, for example, the victim of a
173
See Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical
Liability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 154 (2014).
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Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1094 (2006) (conducting an
empirical study from a data set of medical malpractice claims in Texas and finding that only
0.1% of claims that resulted in payment were brought by claimants who represented
themselves in litigation).
177
See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(2) (2012).
178
See Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution,
Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 431,
455 (2008).
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See Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim’s Expanding Role in a System
of Public Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164, 182–83 (2011). Professor Dan Kahan has described the
distinctive meaning of criminal wrongdoing as the “denial of some important value, such as
the victim’s moral worth.” Kahan, supra note 170, at 597.
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Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 165, at 87 (explaining how criminal procedure
neglects the power of remorse and apology, even though victims and victimized communities
have traditionally viewed them as essential parts of criminal justice).
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mugging feels distress not only because of lost money from a wallet but also because
of natural feelings of violation and belittlement caused by the perpetrator and his
act.182 Such feelings are undoubtedly magnified when commission of the crime
involves betrayal of the significant trust commonly associated with patient-doctor
relationships. Many patients have no choice but to trust deeply in their physicians,
owing in part to the complexity of medical information, the immeasurability of the
quality of health care, and the general uncertainty and inability of patients to make
informed health care decisions.183 When patients suffer from especially poor health,
they can feel even more powerless and dependent on their physicians. Under such
circumstances, violations associated with health care fraud have the potential to be
particularly devastating to patients, and the cathartic experience of gaining
recognition as a crime victim can be all the more important.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND BEYOND
The phenomenon of missing victims in health care fraud has normative
implications not only for how we conceptualize, investigate, and prosecute criminal
cases of health care fraud, but also for how the machinery of criminal justice
approaches and defines all complex crimes with malleable harms, including many
white collar offenses. Before I address the broader implications, I offer a package of
reforms specific to criminal health care fraud.
A. Recasting Criminal Health Care Fraud
Today, criminal health care fraud is out of sync with some of our most basic
intuitions about harm, punishment, victims, and the purposes of the criminal law. In
Part III, I explained how statutory and sentencing frameworks, organizational
structures, and forces within the bureaucracy of the federal criminal justice system
influence agents and prosecutors to channel scarce resources towards identifying the
economic losses suffered by the government and private insurers. However, they do
so at the expense of the real people who suffer the worst kinds of harm and who are
the least powerful. To begin the process of recasting health care fraud in a way that
better recognizes the physical harms suffered by patient-victims, I suggest the
following combination of modest adjustments and large-scale, systemic reforms.
1. Statutory Gradations of Harm
Given that § 1347 is the primary health care fraud statute and can be used to
prosecute the broadest range of schemes, it seems a logical place to concentrate
statutory reform efforts. As I explained in Part III, although the statute includes a
penalty structure that increases maximum penalties when violations result in serious
182
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bodily injury or death,184 § 1347 fails to account meaningfully for most patient harms
and risks of harm.
An example of a law from the realm of violent crime that has a more effective
and comprehensive penalty structure is the bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113.
Like the health care fraud statute, § 2113 criminalizes certain kinds of conduct aimed
at obtaining money from particular classes of victim (banks vs. health care benefit
programs).185 The two statutes are also similar in that they both provide increased
penalties based on the harmful nature of the means used by an offender to achieve
her goal of unjust enrichment. But § 2113 does so in a way that is far more
comprehensive. Mere theft from a bank of over $1,000 without the use of force,
violence, intimidation, or entry into the bank is punishable by up to ten years.186 The
cap increases to twenty years, however, if the offender uses force, violence, or
intimidation, or if the offender actually enters or attempts to enter the bank.187 The
cap increases again to twenty-five years if the offender assaults any person or puts a
person’s life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon.188 If an offender forces
a person to accompany her without the person’s consent or kills any person, a tenyear mandatory minimum applies.189 If the offense results in a person’s death, the
statute penalizes the offender with a mandatory life sentence or death.190
Essentially, the structure of § 2113 dispenses punishment for conduct meant to
enrich the offender based on a sliding scale keyed to the offender’s willingness to
risk harm to others in achieving her goal. Using a threatening demand note to obtain
money triggers a higher maximum than merely taking money when no one is
looking. Bringing a loaded handgun into the bank results in more potential
punishment than the demand note. Forcing a hostage to walk to the getaway car
yields not only a higher maximum but also a mandatory minimum sentence. Finally,
causing the death of another person results in a mandatory life sentence with the
possibility of a death penalty.
Notice that, aside from the most severe penalties reserved for robberies that
result in death, the other penalty increases are not contingent on anyone actually
suffering physical harm. Rather, the statute punishes knowing or reckless conduct
that puts the health and safety of others at risk. In contrast, the health care fraud
statute does not differentiate between offenses that put patients at risk of harm and
those that do not. It does not even distinguish between schemes that actually cause
bodily harm to patients and those that do not. And the relatively meaningless bump
in the maximum for causing serious bodily injuries applies only to a small sliver of
cases.
Amending § 1347 to include a penalty structure resembling that of § 2113 could
be a significant first step both in shifting the attention of criminal justice insiders to
184
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patient harms and in broadening the social meaning of health care fraud to express
moral condemnation of conduct that risks the well-being of patients. Such a
structure, as applied to health care fraud, could signal that exposing patients to any
risk of physical harm merits differential treatment, and that causing any bodily
injury, even if below the level of “serious bodily injury,” is deemed worthy of
consequence. Mandatory minimum penalties for schemes that result in death or
serious bodily injury also seem worth consideration.
2. Discrete Sentencing Guidelines
More than anything else, the primacy of economic loss in the sentencing of
health care fraud cases is attributable to the fact that the guidelines’ ranges for all
health care fraud offenders are calculated under section 2B1.1, the set of provisions
applicable to all cases of fraud and theft.191 It seems that one of the most effective
ways to give greater weight to patient harms, as well as to signal the moral
condemnation appropriate for offenders who violate patient trust, would be to
establish a separate set of guidelines applicable to all cases of health care fraud
bearing upon issues of patient health and safety.192
The mere act of creating a new set of guidelines for cases that present risks to
patient health and safety could yield fruit simply by prompting investigators,
prosecutors, judges, and others to ask themselves whether the particular case before
them fits within that category. For example, prior to indictment, prosecutors often
prepare memoranda applying relevant statutory and sentencing frameworks to the
facts and evidence of particular cases. Nudging prosecutors earlier in an
investigation to be more cognizant of how a fraudulent scheme might have impacted
patients could encourage them to channel more resources toward the investigation
of patient harms.
Similar to the kinds of gradations I described above in reference to an amended
§ 1347, the specific offense characteristics of a new set of guidelines could gauge
the seriousness of health care fraud offenses based in part on factors pertaining to
the exposure of patients to risks of bodily or psychological injury, actual instances
of bodily or psychological injury, instances of serious bodily injury, and instances
of death. The provisions could also account for the magnitude of patient harms by
differentiating more precisely between cases that affect a single patient, five patients,
ten patients, twenty patients, and so forth.193 Perhaps most importantly, while the
191
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amount of economic harm contemplated by a scheme should remain a significant
factor in cases involving patient harm, it should not be so weighty as to overshadow
the patient-harm elements.
3. Notice Mechanisms
Presently, no reliable mechanism exists to provide notice to patients exposed to
risks of harm from health care fraud. Only those individuals known by agents and
prosecutors to have been directly and proximately harmed as a result of a scheme
qualify as “crime victims” under the CVRA, and unless identified during the course
of the investigation, even their names may not make it onto the list of victims
designated to receive notifications of CVRA rights.194
One potential fix for this notification problem involves developing a notice
mechanism applicable to all cases in which an alleged health care fraud scheme may
have exposed patients to risks of harm. Such a mechanism could provide for
automatic notification at the time of indictment to all known patients who received
treatment, services, or devices from the charged defendant (perhaps limited by a
certain window of years).195 The content of the notification could be narrow in scope,
advising that the defendant had been charged with participating in a health care fraud
scheme that involved some risk to patients, and that the recipient was receiving
notice by virtue of his status as a past patient. The notice would not advise the
recipients that they were “crime victims,” but it should provide sufficient
information to enable recipients to obtain copies of the indictment and to contact the
case agents or prosecutors.
This kind of notification system could be useful in several ways. It could
improve the chances that actual crime victims receive notice of a crime that harmed
them. It could assist investigators and prosecutors in identifying patient harms and
gathering evidence about them for later use at trial and sentencing. It could alert
patients to latent injuries that could benefit from medical attention. And, finally, the
broad use of such a mechanism over time could help expand the social meaning of
health care fraud to better reflect the risks of harm to patients.
4. Dynamic Enforcement
As criminal acts of terrorism became more sophisticated and dangerous, the
FBI gradually recognized that it needed to make changes to the internal organization
of its agents and resources to maximize the effectiveness of prevention and
enforcement efforts. It shifted agents to new investigative units, created multiagency task forces, and dedicated resources to develop expert knowledge in several
relevant areas, such as cyber warfare, international financing, and technologies
194
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central to the development and detection of weapons of mass destruction.196 In
contrast, the internal organization of the investigators and prosecutors who handle
health care fraud remains fixed on a white-collar model that is ill equipped to detect
and address patient harms. A reform agenda should include efforts to reconfigure
the criminal justice bureaucracy in ways that enhance its ability to identify and treat
the harms suffered by patients.
After government officials began recognizing health care fraud as a high
priority in the 1990s, the government took steps to increase the effectiveness of
enforcement efforts, such as by creating the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control
Program (HCFAC) in 1996 and the Health Care Fraud Prevention & Enforcement
Action Team (HEAT) in 2009.197 While those programs resulted in additional
enforcement resources and enhanced coordination among federal agencies and state
and local law enforcement, the resources and task forces created through those
programs were not used to make systemic improvements to the identification and
treatment of patient harms. The anti-fraud provisions of the Affordable Care Act
focused even greater attention on economic harms.198 The FBI continues to assign
the bulk of health care fraud investigations to its white-collar crime unit, and most
resources remain dedicated to auditing claims for reimbursement, scrutinizing
payments to providers, and calculating estimates of economic loss.
Reform of the bureaucracy should begin with a close look at how we can create
a more balanced approach to detecting and addressing the harms wrought by health
care fraud. For instance, the makeup of investigative task forces could be diversified
to include more medical experts who would have the ability to evaluate potential
health risks raised by a target’s conduct. Resources dedicated to review of claim
submissions could be shifted in part to allow for more comprehensive review of
patient medical records. Agents could make it a more regular practice to conduct
interviews of a target’s patients. Investigative teams could include more agents and
prosecutors with experience handling cases involving individual victims. We should
also strive to improve coordination between those law enforcement personnel with
experience operating within white-collar units and those from the outside who have
skill sets more adept at developing evidence pertaining to physical harms.
Finally, we should consider decoupling the funding of law enforcement efforts
against health care fraud from the monetary recoveries that result from those efforts.
When the annual report on health care fraud enforcement efforts touts that the return
on investment from enforcement efforts was $7.90 for each $1.00 expended,199 that
sends a strong signal that the value of enforcement efforts should be measured in
terms of dollars recovered, creating unnecessary bureaucratic pressures to keep that
ratio high by focusing on financial harms.
196
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B. Broader Normative Implications
The phenomenon of missing victims in health care fraud is an increasingly
urgent problem now that health care fraud itself has become such a dominant part of
federal law enforcement. But it also raises a set of deeper issues concerning the
machinery of criminal justice, issues that suggest a research agenda for further work.
At a fundamental level, we need to think more about which kinds of harms and
victims justify deployment of our powerful, yet limited, criminal justice resources.
Because the scarcity of those resources is a feature, not a bug, of our criminal justice
system, it is all the more important that we use them in ways that comport with
societal values and best serve the purposes of criminal punishment. In areas where
we expend those limited resources to remedy only economic harms suffered by only
the most powerful entities, such as the government or large corporations, there is
reason to question whether our system has gone astray. If resourceful entities have
the capacity to seek redress elsewhere, perhaps we should be conserving the precious
tools of our criminal justice apparatus to better stand up for those victims who need
them the most, the real people who suffer the kinds of harms that can devastate a
person’s life.
A related area of inquiry centers on how agents and prosecutors make decisions
about harms and victims. The malleability of harms and victims in health care fraud
should trouble us for what it reveals, more generally, about the inconspicuous
shaping of criminal cases occurring in places outside the realm of public
accountability. The further we get from classic mala in se offenses, the greater the
risk that external statutory and sentencing frameworks, in combination with internal
bureaucratic forces and incentives, will motivate insiders to shape cases in ways that
do not comport with our fundamental beliefs about which wrongs and which victims
most merit recognition. If insiders in the deep recesses of the criminal justice
bureaucracy are the ones deciding who gets to be a victim and which harms get to
be recognized, we should ensure that there are sufficient checks to steer their
decisions towards the societal values that we choose to promote. As an initial matter,
more work needs to be done to identify and understand the underlying forces and
hidden levers of power within the machinery of criminal justice. We cannot make
adjustments to its output without a more thorough understanding of the inner
workings of the criminal justice machine.
The recent trend in scholarship on law enforcement has been toward focusing
on police officers and local prosecutors at the state level, in part out of recognition
that the federal system is distinct and accounts for a relatively small share of all
criminal cases. But there is good reason to shift more of the focus to the agents and
prosecutors who operate at the federal level. Federal cases tend to result from
investigations that are more proactive and have far more resources to target the kinds
of complicated criminal conduct that might otherwise escape prosecution, like health
care fraud. These are precisely the kinds of cases most likely to present malleable
harms and victims. The federal system also merits greater study in light of the
growing impact of health care fraud and other complex federal crimes on the
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economy and law enforcement. To better align our values with the shaping processes
that take place at the federal level, we need to improve our understanding of the
practices of federal agents and prosecutors in particular. Who are their
constituencies? How can we encourage them to be more responsive to the needs of
individual victims? How do we ensure the interests of the public, as opposed to
agent-driven or prosecutor-driven interests, are what control the winding paths taken
by complex federal investigations and prosecutions?
Finally, more work is needed to understand how the investigative and
prosecutorial decisions of agents and prosecutors affect intuitions about punishment
in white-collar cases rooted in fraud. Punishment intuitions in such cases, unlike
classic mala in se crimes, are particularly untethered and appear to seesaw depending
on who was harmed, how they were harmed, and why they were harmed. All of
those factors speak to the gravamen of the wrong, but none of them prove the
elements of the crime. At trial, it is enough for the government to show a defendant
acted with intent to defraud, regardless of the harmful consequences. As a result,
agents exercise enormous discretion in gathering (or not gathering) evidence about
those harm factors, and prosecutors can exert tremendous power by using them as
leverage during the plea bargaining process. By offering stipulations that cap the
amount of harm or limit the number or kinds of victims, for example, prosecutors
can exploit the ungrounded nature of our intuitions for punishing white-collar
offenses for the purpose of inducing plea agreements. These kinds of bargaining
chips are off the books and, for that reason, raise concerns. We need to better
understand the power that derives from being able to shape the contours of a
malleable white-collar offense, and then be prepared to explore whether it is being
exercised in ways that best serve the interests of the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
The names of the missing victims of health care fraud appear in plain sight on
the claim submission forms and payment records that agents and prosecutors collect
and review during the course of their financial investigations. But in many cases, the
dollar figures next to their names tell only part of the health care fraud story. The
time has come to implement reforms that will spur criminal justice insiders to take
the steps necessary to seek out and tell the rest of the story. When we fail to identify
and recognize the patients whose health and well-being are threatened by acts of
health care fraud, we devalue those patient-victims and skew the punishments of the
offenders who exploit patients as a means to enrich themselves. The effectiveness
of our enforcement efforts suffers as a result.
The phenomenon of missing victims has ramifications that extend beyond
health care fraud. It highlights the importance of being more alert to the forces in the
shadows of our criminal justice bureaucracy that shape and define the contours of
criminal cases, especially many of the traditional white-collar offenses that present
the most malleable harms and victims. Failure to do so risks resulting in a system of
criminal justice that protects the interests of powerful corporate and government
entities while neglecting the flesh-and-blood victims who need its protection the

2015]

MISSING VICTIMS OF HEALTH CARE FRAUD

657

most. We need to consider how investigative and prosecutorial discretion impacts
not only criminals but also victims and, more generally, our intuitions about
punishment and the social meanings of particular crimes. When criminal justice
insiders exercise that discretion in ways that diverge from societal values and the
public interest, we should be prepared to implement checks that steer them back in
the right direction.

